Rosenberg in New York Times

Naomi Rosenberg's Op-Ed in the Sunday New York Times is the best piece of writing I have had the painful pleasure to read in a long time. The title is How to Tell a Mother her Child Is Dead. Warning: this is not an easy piece to read.

Read it. Read the whole thing. Read it again. There is no excerpt I can offer.

Why is it so good? She does not clear her throat. She does not introduce the subject -- the title did that. She dives right in: "First you get your coat."  She uses short, declarative, active sentences. The absence of contractions is powerful.

She does not beat us over the head with the obvious, or fill it with policy-blather. She reminds us of the daily tragedy in many cities, like my hometown of Chicago, that we must no longer ignore.

She reminds us of the deep humanity of doctors who pick up the pieces. The emergency room doctor who took care my mother could have been Dr. Rosenberg, and I will forever be thankful for her consideration. "You use the mother’s name and you use her child’s name."  Yes. Too often in our many doctor visits raising four children, someone addressed us as "Mom" and "Dad." We're not dumb. We know that means you can't bother to look down at the sheet in front of you to read and pretend to know who we are.

She reminds us to treat people in awful circumstances with the same humanity and respect as she treats her patients, not as numbers, abstractions, easy categories or talking points for longstanding policy arguments.

Had she said any of that, it would have been much weaker. She didn't need to say it. In all likelihood, neither do I.

Let us remember Dr. Rosenberg and her colleagues this labor day, as they will be at that painful work while we barbecue.

Syverson on the productivity slowdown

Chad Syverson has an interesting new paper on the sources of the productivity slowdown.

Background to wake you up: Long-term US growth is slowing down. This is a (the!) big important issue in economics (one previous post).  And productivity -- how much each person can produce per hour -- is the only source of long-term growth. We are not vastly better off than our grandparents because we negotiated better wages for hacking at coal with pickaxes.

Why is productivity slowing down? Perhaps we've run out of ideas (Gordon). Perhaps a savings glut and the  zero bound drive secular stagnation lack of demand (Summers). Perhaps the out of control regulatory leviathan is killing growth with a thousand cuts (Cochrane).

Or maybe productivity  isn't declining at all, we're just measuring new products badly (Varian; Silicon Valley). Google maps is free! If so, we are living with undiagnosed but healthy deflation, and real GDP growth is actually doing well.

Chad:

First, the productivity slowdown has occurred in dozens of countries, and its size is unrelated to measures of the countries’ consumption or production intensities of information and communication technologies ... Second, estimates... of the surplus created by internet-linked digital technologies fall far short of the $2.7 trillion or more of “missing output” resulting from the productivity growth slowdown...Third, if measurement problems were to account for even a modest share of this missing output, the properly measured output and productivity growth rates of industries that produce and service ICTs [internet] would have to have been multiples of their measured growth in the data. Fourth, while measured gross domestic income has been on average higher than measured gross domestic product since 2004—perhaps indicating workers are being paid to make products that are given away for free or at highly discounted prices—this trend actually began before the productivity slowdown and moreover reflects unusually high capital income rather than labor income (i.e., profits are unusually high). In combination, these complementary facets of evidence suggest that the reasonable prima facie case for the mismeasurement hypothesis faces real hurdles when confronted with the data.

An interesting read throughout. 

[Except for that last sentence, a near parody of academic caution!]  

Lazear on Dodd-Frank and Capital

Ed Lazear has a nice WSJ oped, "How not to prevent the next financial meltdown." (Also available here via Hoover.) The main points will not be new to readers of this blog, or my much longer essay but the piece is admirable for putting the basic points so clearly and concisely.

The core problem of focusing on institutions not activities:

The theory behind so-called systemically important financial institutions, or SIFIs, is fundamentally flawed. Financial crises are pathologies of an entire system, not of a few key firms. Reducing the likelihood of another panic requires treating the system as a whole, which will provide greater safety than having the government micromanage a number of private companies.

A crisis is a run:

The risks to a system are most pronounced when financial institutions borrow heavily to finance investments. If the value of the assets falls or becomes highly uncertain, creditors—who include depositors—will rush to pull out their money. The institution fails when it is unable to find a new source of funds to meet these obligations.

Nay, a crisis is a systemic run:

A bank’s inability to pay off its creditors can be transmitted to others. The mechanism can be direct: The debtor bank defaults, and its creditors cannot repay their creditors, etc. But the mechanism can be indirect. The suspicion that similar assets held by other institutions are subject to the same downward pressure can start a run at even an unrelated financial institution.

Ok, a minor disagreement here: The dominoes theory -- I fail, I don't pay you, you fail, you don't pay Joe, Joe fails, etc. -- is popular and enshrined in much Dodd-Frank rule making. It simply did not happen. Our financial crises are simultaneous runs, not failure dominoes. I fail, your investors see that and worry you might not pay them back, so they run, and so on. Companies do understand counterparty risk! And even small equity buffers multiply -- For a domino to go from A to E, A's losses must exceed all the combined equity of A, B, C, D, and E. Domino models tend to have large single counterparty exposures and no equity.  But, this is an oped, and it's a story widely told, so I can't blame Lazear for passing it on as a possibility.

The stability of equity:

consider the contrast between the 2008 financial crisis and the dot-com crash in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

The bursting of the dot-com bubble and subsequent failure of many Internet-based companies had serious repercussions for investors, but not for the financial sector. That’s because the failed firms were financed primarily through equity, not borrowed money. Investors took big losses when the value of tech companies fell precipitously. But there were no runs.

Floating-value liabilities also are run-proof:

Mutual funds are similar. Many are large and hold assets that may be risky, but they don’t fail when the value of their assets falls. The liabilities move one-for-one with the value of the assets because the fund does not promise to pay off any fixed amount to its investors. There is no reason for a run: Getting money out first serves no purpose to investors nor does withdrawal of funds cause significant distress. The fund simply sells the assets at the market price and returns that amount to investors.

Mortgage backed securities are fine -- if held long-only in investor's portfolios. It's funding MBS by rolling over overnight debt that causes problems.

The bottom line: equity financed investment and narrowly backed deposits

These factors suggest that instead of trying to divine which firms are systemically important, banks should be required to get a larger share of the funds they invest by selling stock. Bank investment funded by equity avoids the danger of a run: If the value of a bank’s assets falls, so too does the value of its liabilities. There is no advantage in getting to the bank before others do.

deposits—the checking and saving accounts that are bank liabilities—should be invested only in short-maturity secure assets, like Treasury bills.

Good news: These views seem to be taking hold. The people who run the regulatory agencies are pretty smart, they do listen, and they understand better than we do just how unworkable the plan is for them to make sure no big highly levered bank ever loses money again:

The Federal Reserve seems to be wising up, and may require higher equity capital for the SIFIs and place less emphasis on regulation

Additionally, the international Financial Stability Board announced on July 31 that it would set aside work on designating funds or asset managers as systemically important to focus instead on whether their activities or products were systemically important.

The last point is especially important. There has been a little noticed effort underway to designate asset managers as "systemically important." Asset managers buy and sell stocks on your behalf. There is no fixed value promise and no run here. But there is a chorus that worries the asset managers might all sell, herd, or otherwise act with behavioral biases and they need to be regulated as SIFI. If you understand that a crisis is a run, and that the government should not try to prevent any asset from ever losing value, you see this is not such a great idea.

Ben-Gad and the Minotaur

Michael Ben-Gad has a smashing review, "Into the Labyrinth", of Yanis Varoufakis' The Global Minotaur (Disclaimer: I have not read it and don't intend to.) It's a great piece of writing as well as a cogent analysis. Some excerpts:

"The idée fixe that dominates The Global Minotaur, and apparently dominated Mr Varoufakis’s squabbles with the other Eurogroup ministers of finance, is that some countries are inherently more productive than others and therefore always generate current account surpluses, while others always generate deficits, and fixed exchange rates or monetary unions only exacerbate this imbalance. Hence, for the world economy to function, the surpluses need to be recycled though a system of regular transfer payments from the core to the periphery.

Why do these imbalances emerge? According to the theory of comparative advantage as formulated by David Ricardo in the early 19th century, different countries specialise in the production of particular goods and then exchange them for others, and trade is mutually beneficial even if some countries are more efficient at producing all goods. Mr Varoufakis’s theory rejects all this. Instead, he argues, some countries are destined to specialise in the production of goods and services, while others on the periphery will forever specialise in consuming them. Put into layman’s terms, what this means is that the people of Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland produce cars, wooden clogs, or mobile phones and sell them to the people of Greece, who pay for it all with money – and to make this trade sustainable the cash needs to be regularly replenished in an endless loop by the people of Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland.

This is a story we hear quite often beyond Mr. Varoufakis -- that a currency union requires countries to be similar, with similar productivity. I'm glad to see it so effectively skewered. In Ricardo's famous example, Portugal sells wine to Britain, which sells wool to Portugal, even if one is better at both than the other. They were on a common currency, gold.

On predictable US-bashing:

In Mr Varoufakis’s world the biggest villains are companies such as Walmart that exploit their efficiency to immiserate communities by making them pay less And of course the worst thing about Walmart is that it is American.

....Apparently, between the end of the war and the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1973, the Americans had a global plan, helpfully labelled ‘the global plan’, to dominate the world by permanently running current account surpluses and paying down its debt. Then this ended and was replaced by a new global plan to dominate the world by running permanent current account deficits and letting its debt soar. Devious Yanks. 

This last paragraph gets the golden skewer award for prose.

First,  he would have all remaining government debts still owed to banks written off. Why? Well, everyone hates banks, and it is apparently a neoliberal myth that their shares are owned by pension funds, university endowments or just ordinary people saving for retirement. Banks are really owned by Bond villains who live underneath hollowed-out volcanos.

Second, a substantial part of the remaining debt – about 60 per cent of GDP – would be mutualised across the eurozone so that, whenever the spirit moved them, governments could costlessly default on their bond payments, each one safe in the knowledge that any repudiated debt would immediately become an obligation for the taxpayers in the 18 remaining countries – unless, of course, they defaulted first. This is a variation on the prisoner’s dilemma game, but on steroids. 

Oh, I give up, just go read the whole thing.

Then read his equally good review of Thomas Pikettty, from a year ago, which starts

Reading Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century from front to back was a mistake.

Better to read the last hundred pages first, with their recommendations for the confiscation of wealth and marginal income tax rates nearing 100 per cent, and then read the preceding 470 pages to decide whether the flimsy evidence, conjecture and questionable theories the author offers justify such draconian measures....