Clinton Plan

The WSJ asked me to review the Hillary Clinton economic plan, motivated by her August 11 speech introducing it.  The Op-Ed is here.

I read a good deal of the "plan" on hillaryclinton.com. What I discovered is that there is so much plan that there really isn't any plan at all.



For example, follow me down to the  Fact sheet at the bottom of the website to figure out just what the "infrastructure" plan is about.  Some snippets:

Clinton will make smart, targeted, and coordinated investments to increase capacity, improve road quality, and reduce congestion 

Clinton will prioritize and increase investments in public transit to connect Americans to jobs, spur economic growth, and improve quality of life in our communities. And she will encourage local governments to work with low-income communities to ensure that these investments are creating transit options that connect the unemployed and underemployed to the jobs they need. She will also support bicycle and pedestrian infrastructure 

Clinton will make smart, coordinated investments that upgrade our aging rail tunnels and bridges, expand congested highway corridors, eliminate dangerous at-grade railway crossings, and build deeper port channels to accommodate the newest and largest cargo ships. Clinton will also focus on vital “intermodal” transfer points between trucks, rail, and ships—including the “last-mile connectors” between different modes, like the local roads that connect highways to ports. She is committed to initiating upgrades of at least the 25 most costly freight bottlenecks by the end of her first term. (bold italics in the original) 

The Federal Aviation Administration is currently pursuing a “NextGen” upgrade program... But these efforts have fallen chronically behind schedule and well short of expectations. Clinton will get this crucial program back on track and ensure that it is managed effectively and with accountability. 

Clinton will also invest in building world-class American airports...with reliable and efficient connections to mass transit. ... 

committing that by 2020, 100 percent of households in America will have access to affordable broadband that delivers world-class speeds sufficient to meet families’ needs.

A wide-ranging system of advanced energy fueling stations for the 21st century fleet. A network of roadway sensors capable of alerting drivers to a dangerous icy patch a mile ahead. 

Clinton will invest in creating a world-leading passenger rail system to meet rapidly growing demand and build a more mobile America. 

...Clinton’s plan will modernize our pipeline system, increase rail safety, and enhance grid security. It will also build new infrastructure to power our economic future and capture America’s clean energy potential. ... 

We need a bold agenda to revitalize our aging water infrastructure and make it more sustainable and energy efficient. Clinton will work to harness both public and private resources to support these efforts. 

Modernizing our dams and levees ...our efforts to maintain these critical structures are haphazard and under-resourced ...We need to substantially increase funding to inspect these structures, bring them into good repair, and remove them where appropriate. ... 

Clinton will support efforts to increase dams’ capacity to deliver affordable and reliable electricity while reducing carbon pollution.

And it goes on like this.

The positive view of all this is  that someone running the vast American bureacracy should have a detailed plan for what they want that bureuacracy to do.  Well, there is plenty of detail here, and it's a good bet that Donald Trump has never thought about traffic jams at intermodal transfer facilities.

So how can I say there is no "plan?"

The other job of an Administration is to set priorities, which means something has to come second. This is what Clinton will propose in her first 100 days, and what she will accomplish in 5 years, with $50 billion a year? You must be kidding. Turning Amtrak alone into a "world-leading passenger rail system" would swallow her $275 billion

There are no numbers here anywhere. The $275 billion is clearly just a made up number that sounds sortof big but not so big as to attract tax-and-spend criticism. Because that is the last number in the whole document. In my rough calculation, she blew $275 billion by the first paragraph. As a consequence,  analysts who calculate how many "jobs" the "Clinton plan" will create are just making it up too.

There is no timeline or process The President of the US is not a King or dictator who waves her hands and upgrades at intermodal transfer facilities just happen. The president appoints cabinet secretaries, who oversee a bureaucracy, which must, by law conducts proper cost benefit analysis, follow the Administrative Procedures Act,  submit plans for EPA review, and so on.

The job of an Administration is also to understand and figure out how to surmount the institutional barriers that have stopped all of these fine and very old ideas from happening before. If Governor Brown and President Obama have not been able to lay a foot of high-speed track in 8 years, how is she going to do so much better?

As I mentioned in the oped, it fails to ask, why are these things problems in the first place? Apparently, traffic jams where trucks unload trains happen when the President is not, herself, there to run things. It's an implicitly damning condemnation of her predecessor -- he was either not studious enough to do his homework to this detail, or insufficiently "committed to initiating upgrades""at  costly freight bottlenecks"

In my world, things go wrong when markets go wrong, or the structures of government fail. In this world, things happen only on the will and attention of the President, including traffic jams. The people in charge now are either idiots, Republicans blocking progress, or just insufficiently guided by the great leader on top.  One need do not analysis of why things are going wrong, just "fight" to fix them. 

This "plan" implies a stinging rebuke of her predecessor, when you think about it. If all it takes is the force of Hllary's will to accomplish all this in 5 years for $275 billion, just why did he fail in 8 years with about $10 trillion? Maybe, just maybe, President Obama was trying darn hard, using the same methods, and came up short for a reason?


There is, literally, no plan. I looked hard through the website, and this "fact sheet" is the bottom level for infrastructure. Yet it keeps referring to what "the plan" will do, with no citations or links. That's all over the website. Thousands of pages talk about the plan, but no pages are, grammatically the plan itself.

Lost in details   And this is just one fact sheet, 6 levels deep in the website.  You get here from (click on bold) 

1) Hllaryclinton.com

2) About / Act / Issues / Shop / More / Español / Donate

3) All Issues / Economy and jobs / Education / Environment / Health / Justice and equality / National security

4) A fair tax system / Jobs and Wages /  Paid family and medical leave .../ Fixing America's infrastructure / ... (17 boxes in all)

5) As president, Hillary will:

• Repair and expand our roads and bridges....
• Lower transportation costs and unlock economic opportunity by expanding public transit options. ...
• Connect all Americans to the internet.... 
• Invest in building world-class American airports and modernize our national airspace system. ..
• Build energy infrastructure for the 21st century. ..

(Looking over all 17 tabs of the "Economy and Jobs" tab, I lost count at 139 such bullet points.)

And finally this  Fact sheet. Transport is actually one of the best thought out of all the tabs.

The point, if each such fact sheet promises that Mrs. Clinton is "committed" to details as fine as solving intermodal freight bottlenecks (the bold italics really got to me), across all 17 tabs of economic policy x 7 tabs of policy areas, she and her administration will get nothing done.

In sum, I think the picture I painted is unavoidable. Clinton and her team are well meaning, but this document (the website) displays an unbelievable naivete about how American government works. Every possible "policy solution" to every perceived problem in America got thrown in, with no thought of where the problems came from, no acknowledgement that good people have been trying hard for years, and that American government has an important set of checks and balances and a policy process. No, she will wave her hand and all will be well. 

Perhaps she and her team are wiser, and this is just a campaign document designed to please media analysts and voters. But if that is the case, it displays an unbelievable disdain for the intelligence of the media and voters she wishes to attract. 

Red Tape 

The thousands of pages of the website do address how Mrs. Clinton will succeed where President Obama failed: She will "break through washington gridlock" and get rid of "red tape." Period. 

This had me guffawing. Really? That's all it takes? Too bad President Obama never had that idea! (He did, and had an office devoted to the project. With little success.) 

Her speech made some progress on just how she will break through "gridlock": 

What we need is serious, steady leadership that can find common ground and build on it based on hard but respectful bargaining. 

Leadership that rises above personal attacks and name calling, not revels in it.... 

ogether, we'll make full use of the White House's power to convene. We'll get everyone at the table – not just Republicans and Democrats, but business and labor leaders...academics and experts... and, most importantly, all of you. I want working people to have a real say in your government again.

That means we have to get unaccountable money out of our politics, overturn Citizens United, and expand voting rights, not restrict them. 

Starting even before the election, we will bring together leaders from across our economy and our communities for meetings on jobs, American competitiveness, and working families. 

I omitted the, well, "personal attacks" on Donald Trump, so we can think about just how plausible this is once he's off the stage. And then it's just roll-your-eyes funny. The major proposal is... more Town Hall meetings and "listening" tours?  I would think, given current scandals, she'd be a little circumspect about "money in politics," and if you want to show your "listening" abilities, perhaps those who think Citizens United was a good idea might be a place to start.

If Mrs. Clinton wants to listen, and reach out to Republicans, she doesn't need to "convene" everyone at the table. And least of all, she doesn't need more policy-wonks stuffing her campaign website with every little idea that public policy schools and liberal think tanks dream up. Paul Ryan's "a better way" plan is right there on the internet. She should get a good glass of wine, sit down with that plan, pick 5 things she can live with, and go with them or see how to meet them half way.

This should be taken as constructive and nonpartisan criticism. Do not mistakenly imply anything about Mr. Trump in here.  Mrs. Clinton is daily more likely to be our next president. I hope dearly that she could make some progress in coming to compromise on some of the simple and obvious steps that our country needs to take, steps pretty much every bipartisan commission agrees on -- tax and immigration reform, yes, infrastructure, reform of much regulatory process, and so on. She doesn't have to agree on policy, but an approach much more like the famous Shultz memo to Reagan -- written in November! -- is much more likely to succeed.

Sadly, though, this seems like a road to four more years of gridlock.

WSJ growth oped -- full version

WSJ Oped. Now that 30 days have passed, I can post the whole thing. Previous post.

Ending America’s Slow-Growth Tailspin

Sclerotic growth is America’s overriding economic problem. From 1950 to 2000, the U.S. economy grew at an average rate of 3.5% annually. Since 2000, it has grown at half that rate—1.76%. Even in the years since the bottom of the great recession in 2009, which should have been a time of fast catch-up growth, the economy has only grown at 2%. Last week’s 0.5% GDP report is merely the latest Groundhog Day repetition of dashed hopes.

The differences in these small percentages might seem minor, but over time they have big consequences. By 2008, the average American was more than three times better off than in 1952. Real GDP per person rose from $16,000 to $49,000. And those numbers understate the advances in the quality of goods, health and environment that came with growth. But if U.S. growth between 1950 and 2000 had been the 2% of recent years, instead of 3.5%, income per person in 2000 would have risen to just $23,000, not $50,000. That’s a huge difference.

Looking ahead, solving almost all of America’s problems hinges on re-establishing robust economic growth. Over the next 50 years, if income could be doubled relative to 2% growth, the U.S. would be able to pay for Social Security, Medicare, defense, environmental concerns and the debt. Halve that income gain, and none of those spending challenges can be addressed. Doubling income per capita would help the less well off far more than any imaginable transfer scheme.


Why is growth slowing down? One camp says that we’ve run out of ideas. We were supposed to have flying cars and all we got was Twitter. Get used to it, the thinking goes, and start fighting over the shrinking pie.

Another camp holds that the culprit is “secular stagnation,” a “savings glut” demanding sharply negative interest rates that the Federal Reserve cannot deliver. That outlook attracts clever new economic theories and promotes vast new stimulus spending of the sort that Japan has fruitlessly followed.

The third camp (mine) holds that the U.S. economy is simply overrun by an out-of-control and increasingly politicized regulatory state. If it takes years to get the permits to start projects and mountains of paper to hire people, if every step risks a new criminal investigation, people don’t invest, hire or innovate. The U.S. needs simple, common-sense, Adam Smith policies.

America is middle-aged and overweight. The first camp says, well, that’s nature, stop complaining. The second camp looks for the latest miracle diet—try the 10-day detox cleanse! The third camp says get back to the tried, true and sometimes painful: eat right and exercise.

The first two camps are doubtful. How much more growth is really possible from better policies? To get an idea, see the nearby chart plotting 2014 income per capita for 189 countries against the World Bank’s “Distance to Frontier” ease-of-doing-business measure for the same year. The measure combines individual indicators, including starting a business, dealing with construction permits, protecting minority investors, paying taxes and trading across borders. Unlike the more popular ease-of-doing business rankings, this is a measure of how good or bad things are with 100 being the best observed so far, or “Frontier,” score.

In general, the higher a country’s score, the higher its per capita income. The Central African Republic scores a dismal 33, and has an annual per capita income of just $328. Compare that to India (50.3, $1,455), China (61, $7,000) and the U.S. (82, $53,000).

The U.S. scores well, but there is plenty of room for improvement. A score of 100 unites the best already-observed performance in each category. So a score of 100—labeled Frontier—is certainly possible. And, following the fitted line in the chart, Frontier generates $163,000 of income per capita, 209% better than the U.S., or 6% additional annual growth for 20 years. If America could improve on the best seen in other countries by 10%, a 110 score would generate $400,000 income per capita, a 650% improvement, or 15% additional growth for 20 years.

If you think these numbers are absurd, consider China. Between 2000 and 2014, China averaged 15% growth and a 700% improvement in income per capita. This growth did not follow from some grand stimulus or central plan; Mao tried that in the 1960s, producing famine, not steel. China just turned an awful business climate into a moderately bad one.

It is amazing that governments can do so much damage. Yet the evidence of the graph is strong. The nearly controlled experimental comparison of North Korea versus South Korea, or East Germany versus West Germany, is stronger. But if bad institutions can do such enormous harm, it follows inescapably that better institutions can do enormous good.

A growth agenda doesn’t fit neatly into current policy debates. This is fortunate, as new ideas are easier to swallow than defeats.

Parties argue over tax rates, but what’s really needed is deep tax reform, cleaning out the insane complexity and cronyism.

Parties argue over how much to raise or cut spending for social programs, but what’s needed is a thorough overhaul of the programs’ pernicious incentives. For example, Social Security disability needs to remove its disincentives to work, move or change careers.

Parties argue about education spending, but America needs the better schools that come from increased choice and competition.

Most of all, the country needs a dramatic legal and regulatory simplification, restoring the rule of law. Middle-aged America is living in a hoarder’s house of a legal system. State and local impediments such as occupational licensing and zoning are also part of the problem.

Growth-oriented policies will be resisted. Growth comes from productivity, which comes from new technologies and new companies. These displace the profits of old companies, and the healthy pay and settled lives of their managers and workers. Economic regulation is largely designed to protect profits, jobs and wages tied to old ways of doing things. Everyone likes growth, but only in someone else’s backyard.

There is hope. Washington lawmakers need to bring about a grand bargain, moving the debate from “they’re getting their special deal, I want mine,” to “I’m losing my special deal, so they’d better lose theirs too.” While the current presidential front-runners are not championing economic growth, House Speaker Paul Ryan (R., Wis.) and other House members are. And if economic-policy leadership moves from a chaotic presidency to a well-run Congress, that may be healthy for America’s political system as well as for the economy.

Update: response to some criticis

Delong and Logarithms

Brad Delong posted a response to my oped on growth  in the Wall Street Journal. He took issue with my graph, reproduced here,

by making his own graph, here

He characterizes the difference between our graphs with his usual gentlemanly restraint,

"Extraordinarily Unprofessional!!:" "total idiocy" The University of Chicago and the Wall Street Journal Have Very Serious Intellectual Quality Control Problems

and so forth.

If you read Brad, you may wonder what skulduggery I used to make the plot. I will now reveal the dark secret. It's a clever Chicago-school mathematical trick:

Logarithms.

Yes, I plotted log income vs. ease of doing business index.

Now just how much of a sin is this? Well, growth theory is about growth, so it's pretty hard to do without logarithms. If thinking about percentage growth and running regressions with log income on the left hand side is a devious right-wing trick, I'm afraid we're going to have to throw out about 99% of growth theory and empirical economics, including much done by Brad's colleagues at Berkeley.

Furthermore, just look at the graph.  I invite anybody who has sat through a first-year econometrics class where they teach this devious technique to ponder my and Brad's plot, and think whether a level or a log fit is appropriate.

Brad raises one valid concern with all of empirical economics: Endogeneity. The graph is a correlation. How do we know that better ease of doing business causes better business, and not the other way around? In Brad's view, it is equally likely, I guess, that first a contry gets rich, and then it improves its laws and regulations.

I didn't mention this in the Journal, simply for lack of space (try to write anything in 950 words). In a previous blog post, here, I wrote a little bit about it.

One might dismiss the correlation a bit as reverse causation. But look at North vs. South Korea, East vs. West Germany, and the rise of China and India. It seems bad policies really can do a lot of damage. And the US and UK had pretty good institutions when their GDPs were much lower. (Hall and Jones 1999 control for endogeneity in this sort of regression by using instrumental variables.)

(This post isn't hard to find. I linked to from my growth oped post. And if one is curious about "what does John have to say about endogeneity?" -- a rather obvious question, which I ask about twice at every seminar -- it is also possible to email me. )

That post goes on to survey a lot of academic literature on just how important good institutions are to economic growth.

But just think about it. Did North Korea or East Germany first get poor and then get bad institutions? Did the UK and US first get rich, and then develop our rule-of-law and property rights traditions? Is reverse causality at all a plausible explanation for the correlation? Just about every historical episode you can think of goes the other way.

Endogeneity is always an issue in economics, but Brad's case that I am too dumb to have even thought about it, or that this correlation obviously goes the other way,  does not hold up.

But apparently, Brad doesn't know about google, fact checking, or emailing for simple clarifications either. Otherwise he would know that I don't work at Chicago anymore, hardly a secret.

The notion that universities should practice "intellectual quality control" is interesting in this era of declining free speech. Brad, be careful what you wish for.  "Controlling" basic professional ethics may come first.

If anyone is still curious, I posted my data and program to my website, and this post describes it some more. I didn't clean it up well, as I never thought this would be controversial, but at least it documents what I did. Feel free to play with it as you wish.

Update: It's clear from many comments and the twitter storm that many readers, even trained economists, missed this basic point. My graph is an illustration of a conclusion reached by hundreds, if not more, papers in the academic literature. It is not The Evidence, or even particularly novel evidence. Were it so, standard errors, specification search, endogeneity, much better measures of institutions, etc. would be appropriate, as many suggest. My graph is just a quick graphical illustration of the conclusions of much growth economics, including much work by Jones, Acemoglu, Barro, Klenow, and many many others. Institutions matter to economic growth; bad governments have amazing power to ruin economies.  As always in writing, I should have made that clearer; but I thought this literature was familiar to the average economist-blogger.

Update 2: There is, I think, an important mis-specification in a regression of log income on the ease-of-doing business index, which Evan Soltas implicitly points out.  I referred to the index as "simple" and "crude" for this reason, but again it looks like this seemingly obvious point needs expanding.

The World bank's measure is mostly focused on the ease of starting small businesses. When we look at the regulatory sclerosis in the US, it is a much wider phenomenon, encompassing the tax code, social program disincentives, the  recent huge expansion of federal involvement in health and finance, general spread of cronyism, reduction in rule of law, and so forth. These affect large businesses as much or more than small businesses.

Clearly, as we look across countries, the ease of doing business is correlated with these wider legal and regulatory problems. Countries with bad institutions overall also have bad ease of doing business scores. But just as obviously, only fixing the ease of doing business indicators without fixing the larger legal and institutional failures that correlate with those indicators, won't do a whole lot of good, which is what Evan seems to find.

The regulatory program I outlined there and in the longer essay on growth (blog post here, html here,   pdf here) went far beyond ease of doing business indicators, for just this reason.

Update 3: Or, seemingly obvious point #3 that seems to need an answer. A few commenters have questioned  how far "out of sample" one can go. At some point, yes, institutions are perfect and more income will not result from improving them. Where is that? 90? 100? 110? I don't know. But the local derivative is still high, no matter how you fit the "out of sample" points. If you don't think you can draw the line out to 100, going from 82 to 83 still has very large effects.

Growth Interview

I did a short interview with the WSJ's Mary Kissel about my growth oped. If you can't see the embed above, try this direct link or this one. 

WSJ Growth Oped

I did an oped on growth in the Wall Street Journal, titled "Ending America’s Slow-Growth Tailspin." I'll post the full thing here in 30 days.

Blog readers will recognize a distilled version of my longer essay on growth (blog post here, html here,   pdf here), and the graph from Smith v. Jones blog post. I think out loud. The growth essay is much more detailed on diagnosis and especially on policy.

There are three basic ideas (two too many for a good oped).

1) Growth is everything. Increasing growth will do way more for every problem you can name than anything else on the economic agenda. Even if workers in 1910 could have taken all of Rockefeller's wealth, they would have been disastrously poor compared to today.

2) Can policies actually improve growth? The tut-tutters mocked Jeb Bush's 4% aspiration. I outline the "we've run out of ideas" school of thought, most recently in Bob Gordon's thoughtful book; the "everything is right but the zero bound" secular-staglation school, and the view that the growth giant is being held back by a liliputian army of politicized regulators.

As evidence,  I improved on the graph from an earlier post of the World Bank's ease of doing business score vs. GDP per capita,

(if you can't see the graph, click here)

This graph adds a few things relative to the one in WSJ. I added some outliers. Libya and Venzuela seem like countries with good reasons to have temporarily more GDP than their institutions can long support, Rwanda and Georgia the opposite. So the correlation is even better than it looks. Given how crude the world bank measure is, it's surprising it works so well. It's mostly about the difficulties of starting small businesses. I added Greece too to gives some sense of variation within the Euro-US world.

The point: Bad policies can do dramatic harm. Ipso facto, good policies must be able to do a lot of good. The US is not perfect!

A famous economist challenged my view that regulation is causing a lot of problems, noting that all of the big business types he talks to don't complain that much. But I think that's a horrendous selection bias. If you talk to the people still in business, you are talking to the ones that have figured out the political and regulatory game. Go talk to the ones whose businesses are closed, or not even started.

Another point, regulation has been getting worse for decades. Why the slump now? I think that a lot of the government onslaught's effect has been to make the economy less resilient. For example, social security disability is not a problem as long as you have a job. When you lose a job, and go on disability, now the huge disincentive to work, study, move, kicks in.  Recovering from a recession needs new jobs, new businesses, new innovations.

3) A very brief outline of policies to get growth going again. I think the key is to move past the standard rhetoric that defines our current partisan bickering. It's not how much we spend, really, it's how we spend it. Free market economics is not "trickle-down" economics, it's about incentives, simplicity, rule of law, and so forth.

Tax Oped -- full version

Source: Wall Street Journal

An Oped at the Wall Street Journal, "Here's what genuine tax reform looks like." I posted the teaser a month ago, now I can post the whole thing.

Left and right agree that the U.S. tax code is a mess. The men and women running for president in 2016 are offering reform plans, and proposals to fix the code regularly surface in Congress. But these plans are, and should be, political documents, designed to attract votes. To prevent today’s ugly bargains from becoming tomorrow’s conventional wisdom, we should more frequently discuss the ideal tax structure.

The first goal of taxation is to raise needed government revenue with minimum economic damage. That means lower marginal rates—the additional tax people pay for each extra dollar earned—and a broader base of income subject to tax. It also means a massively simpler tax code.


In my view, simplification is more important than rates. A simple code would allow people and businesses to spend more time and resources on productive activities and less on attorneys and accountants, or on lobbyists seeking special deals and subsidies. And a simple code is much more clearly fair. Americans now suspect that people with clever lawyers are avoiding much taxation, which is corrosive to compliance and driving populist outrage across the political spectrum.

What would a minimally damaging, simple, fair tax code look like? First, the corporate tax should be eliminated. Every dollar of taxes that a corporation seems to pay comes from higher prices to its customers, lower wages to its workers, or lower dividends to its shareholders. Of these groups, wealthy individual shareholders are the least likely to suffer. If taxes eat into profits, investors pay lower prices for less valuable shares, and so earn the same return as before. To the extent that taxes do reduce returns, they also financially hurt nonprofits and your and my pension funds.

With no corporate tax, arguments disappear over investment expensing versus depreciation, repatriation of profits, too much tax-deductible debt, R&D deductions, and the vast array of energy deductions and credits.

Second, the government should tax consumption, not wages, income or wealth. When the government taxes savings, investment income, wealth or inheritance, it reduces the incentive to save, invest and build companies rather than enjoy consumption immediately. Taxes on capital gains discourage people from moving or reallocating capital toward their most productive uses.

Recognizing the distortion, the federal government provides a complex web of shelters, including IRAs, Roth IRAs, 527(b), 401(k), health-savings accounts, life-insurance exemptions, and the panoply of trusts that wealthy individuals use to shelter their wealth and escape the estate tax. If investment isn’t taxed, these costly complexities can disappear.

All the various deductions, credits and exclusions should be eliminated—even the holy trinity of tax breaks for mortgage interest, charitable donations and employer-provided health insurance. The extra revenue, over a trillion dollars annually, could finance a large reduction in marginal rates. This step would also simplify the code and make it fairer.

Imagine that Congress proposed to send an annual check to each homeowner. People with high incomes, who buy expensive houses, borrow lots of money or refinance often, would get bigger checks than people with low incomes, who buy smaller houses, save up more for down payments or pay down their mortgages. There would be rioting in the streets. Yet that is exactly what the mortgage-interest deduction accomplishes.

Similarly, suppose Congress proposed to match private charitable donations. But rich people would get a 40% match, middle class people only 10%, and poor people nothing. This is exactly what the charitable deduction accomplishes.

Zeroing out deductions, credits, and corporate and investment taxes matters—for permanence, for predictability and for simplicity. If the corporate rate is drastically reduced, or if deductions are capped, it seems that the economic distortions go away. But the thousands of pages of tax code are still in place, the army of lawyers and accountants and lobbyists is still in place, and the next administration will itch to raise the caps, and the rate.

Why is tax reform paralyzed? Because political debate mixes the goal of efficiently raising revenue with so many other objectives. Some want more progressivity or more revenue. Others defend subsidies and transfers for specific activities, groups or businesses. They hold reform hostage.

Wise politicians often bundle dissimilar goals to attract a majority. But when bundling leads to paralysis, progress comes by separating the issues. Thus, we should agree to first reform the structure of the tax code, leaving the rates blank. We will then separately debate rates, and the consequent overall revenue and progressivity.

Consumption-based taxes can be progressive. A simplified income tax, excluding investment income and allowing a full deduction for savings, could tax high-income earners’ consumption at a higher rate. Low-income people can receive transfers and credits. I think smaller government and less progressivity are wiser. But we can agree on an efficient, simple and fair tax, and debate revenues and progressivity separately.

We should also agree to separate the tax code from the subsidy code. We agree to debate subsidies for mortgage-interest payments, electric cars and the like—transparent and on-budget—but separately from tax reform.

Negotiating such an agreement will be hard. But the ability to achieve grand bargains is the most important characteristic of great political leaders.

Mr. Cochrane is a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.

Tax Oped

Source: Wall Street Journal

An Oped at the Wall Street Journal, "Here's what genuine tax reform looks like." With a new art style by WSJ. (Ungated via Hoover. I have to wait 30 days to post the whole thing.)

 I buried the lead, which I'll excerpt here:

"...Why is tax reform paralyzed? Because political debate mixes the goal of efficiently raising revenue with so many other objectives. Some want more progressivity or more revenue. Others defend subsidies and transfers for specific activities, groups or businesses. They hold reform hostage.

Wise politicians often bundle dissimilar goals to attract a majority. But when bundling leads to paralysis, progress comes by separating the issues. 

Thus, we should agree to first reform the structure of the tax code, leaving the rates blank. We will then separately debate rates, and the consequent overall revenue and progressivity.... we can agree on an efficient, simple and fair tax, and debate revenues and progressivity separately.

We should also agree to separate the tax code from the subsidy code. We agree to debate subsidies for mortgage-interest payments, electric cars and the like—transparent and on-budget—but separately from tax reform.

Negotiating such an agreement will be hard. But the ability to achieve grand bargains is the most important characteristic of great political leaders."

This is, I think, the most novel idea in the oped. All tax reform packages mix changes to the structure of the tax code with specific rates. Then, the wonkosphere goes on a witch hunt of who pays more and who pays less, and the attempt to fix pathological problems in the structure falls apart.

I think our politicians really could negotiate a tax code in which all the rates are left blank. Then, we have a separate debate about what those rates will be.  In fact, tax rates ought to change a lot more often than the tax code itself.

Similarly,  the key to removing the pernicious subsidies in the tax code is again to separate the issues. Taxes are for taxing, then we can debate subsidies.

We need to move from the equilibrium of, I have my subsidy/deduction/credit/special deal, so I won't complain about yours, to the equilibrium of, I gave up my subsidy/deduction/credit special deal, so I'll make darn sure you give up yours too.

Is the Fed Pulling or Pushing?

I did a little interview with Mary Kissel of the Wall Street Journal, following up on thursday's oped. Mary is, as you can tell, a well-informed interviewer and asks some tough questions. She did a great job of pushing hard on the usual Wall Street wisdom about how the Fed, though it has not done anything but talk in years, is secretly behind every gyration of stock or housing prices.

The central point came to me hours later, as it usually does. Is the Fed in fact "holding down" interest rates? Is there some sort of natural market equilibrium that features higher rates now, but the Fed is pushing down rates? That's the conventional view, clearly expressed in Mary's questions.

Well, let's think about that. If a central bank were holding down rates, what would it do? Answer, it would lend a lot of money at low rates. Money would be flowing out the discount window (that's where the Fed lends to banks), to banks, and through banks to the rest of the economy, flooding the place with low-rate loans. The interest rate the Fed pays on reserves and banks pay to borrow from the Fed would be low compared to market rates; credit and term spreads would be large, as the Fed would be trying to drag down those market rates.

That is, of course, the exact opposite of what's happening now. Banks are lending the Fed about $3 trillion worth of reserves, reserves the banks could go out and lend elsewhere if the market were producing great opportunities. Spreads of other rates over the rates banks lend to or borrow from the Fed are very low, not very high. Deposits are flooding in to banks, not loans out of banks.

If you just look out the window, our economy looks a lot more like one in which the Fed is keeping rates high, by sucking deposits out of the economy and paying banks more than they can get elsewhere; not pushing rates down, by lending a lot to banks at rates lower than they can get elsewhere.

In reality of course, the Fed isn't doing that much of anything. Lots of deposits (saving) and a dearth of demand for investment (borrowing) drives (real) interest rates down, and there is not a whole lot the Fed can do about that.  Except to  see the parade going by, grab a flag, jump in front and pretend to be in charge.

Greece and Banking, the oped

Source: Wall Street Journal; Getty Images

A Wall Street Journal Oped with Andy Atkeson, summarizing many points already made on this blog. This was published August 5, so today I'm allowed to post it in its entirety. You've probably seen it already, but this blog is in part an archive. If not, here is the whole thing, with my preferred first paragraph.
Local pdf here.

Greece's Ills [and, more importantly, the Euro's] Require a Banking Fix 

Greece suffered a run on its banks, closing them on June 29. Payments froze and the economy was paralyzed. Greek banks reopened on July 20 with the help of the European Central Bank. But many restrictions, including those on cash withdrawals and international money transfers, remain. The crash in the Greek stock market when it reopened Aug. 3 reminds us that Greece’s economy and financial system are still in awful shape. 


Greece’s banking crisis revealed the main structural problem of the eurozone: A currency union must isolate banks from sovereign debt. To fix this central structural problem, Europe must open its nation-based banking system, recognize that sovereign debt is risky and stop letting countries use national banks to fund national deficits.

If Detroit, Puerto Rico or even Illinois defaults on its debts, there is no run on the banks. Why? Because nobody dreams that defaulting U.S. states or cities must secede from the dollar zone and invent a new currency. Also, U.S. state and city governments cannot force state or local banks to lend them money, and cannot grab or redenominate deposits. Americans can easily put money in federally chartered, nationally diversified banks that are immune from state and local government defaults.

Depositors in the eurozone don’t share this privilege. A Greek cannot, without a foreign address, put money in a bank insulated from the Greek government and its politics. When Greece’s banks fail, international banks can’t step in to offer safe banking services independently of the Greek government.

European bank regulations encourage banks to invest heavily in their own country’s bonds, even when they have lousy ratings. The flawed banking architecture of Europe’s currency union pretends that sovereign default will never happen. Wise Europeans have known about these flaws for years, but the system was never fixed because it allows indebted countries to finance large debts.

This is the euro’s central fault. A currency union must treat sovereign default just like corporate or household default: Defaulters do not leave the currency union, and banks must treat sovereign debt cautiously. When Europeans can put their money into well-diversified pan-European banks, protected from interference from national governments, inevitable sovereign defaults will not spark runs, or destroy local banks and economies. And government bailouts will be far less tempting.

That is the long-term fix, but how does the eurozone get out of its current mess? The ECB’s latest Greek bailout deal is focused on long-run structural reforms, asset sales, budget targets and illusory tax increases. It might at best revive growth in a year or so.

But without well-functioning banks, Greece’s economy will collapse long before such growth arrives. To revive the banks and the economy, Greeks must know their money is safe, now and in the future. So safe that Greeks put money back in the banks, pay debts and seamlessly make payments—with no chance of a euro exit, tightened capital controls that impede international payments or depositor “bail-ins,” a polite word for the government grabbing deposits.

The United States offers a precedent. The U.S. economy ground to a standstill in the banking panic of 1933. The administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt closed America’s banks with a national banking holiday to stem the bank run. It then took immediate steps to restore confidence with the clear promises of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 to resolve insolvent banks, promises backed up by the remarkable rhetoric of FDR’s first fireside chat and the intact borrowing power of the federal government. When banks reopened, Americans lined up to redeposit their money. In the 1980s, the U.S. deregulated banks to allow extensive branch and interstate banking, further isolating local banks from local troubles.

Europe is headed toward bailing out both the Greek government and Greece’s struggling banks. Instead, Europe should resolve and recapitalize the banks alone, put them under private European ownership and control, and insulate them from further Greek government interference. Then Europe can let Greece default, if need be, without another bank run.

Then move on to Italian and Spanish banks, which are similarly larded up with government debts and are threatening the euro. These banks can still be defused slowly, selling their government debts, without huge bailouts.

Europe needs well-diversified, pan-European banks, which must treat low-grade government debt just as gingerly as they treat low-grade corporate debt. Call it a banking union, or, better, open banking. The Greek tragedy can serve to revive the long-dormant but necessary completion of Europe’s admirable common-currency project.

Greece and Banking

Source: Wall Street Journal; Getty Images

A Wall Street Journal Oped with Andy Atkeson, summarizing many points already made on this blog.

Greece suffered a run on its banks, closing them on June 29. Payments froze and the economy was paralyzed. Greek banks reopened on July 20 with the help of the European Central Bank. But many restrictions, including those on cash withdrawals and international money transfers, remain. The crash in the Greek stock market when it reopened Aug. 3 reminds us that Greece’s economy and financial system are still in awful shape. 

Greece’s banking crisis revealed the main structural problem of the eurozone: A currency union must isolate banks from sovereign debt. To fix this central structural problem, Europe must open its nation-based banking system, recognize that sovereign debt is risky and stop letting countries use national banks to fund national deficits.

If Detroit, Puerto Rico or even Illinois defaults on its debts, there is no run on the banks. Why? Because nobody dreams that defaulting U.S. states or cities must secede from the dollar zone and invent a new currency. Also, U.S. state and city governments cannot force state or local banks to lend them money, and cannot grab or redenominate deposits. Americans can easily put money in federally chartered, nationally diversified banks that are immune from state and local government defaults.

Depositors in the eurozone don’t share this privilege....

For the rest, you have to go to WSJ, Hoover (ungated) or wait 30 days until I'm allowed to post it here.

Lucrezia Reichlin and Luis Garicano have an excellent Project Syndicate piece on the same topic.

Writing contest: This is our first paragraph. The Journal's editors thought it was better with latest news first. Which works better?