Trump Taxes

As I see it, important points about the Trump tax affair are not yet reflected in media coverage. 1) This affair reflects the intrinsic difficulties of an income tax. A consumption tax can be more progressive -- Mr. Trump would have likely have paid a lot more. 2) Raising personal income tax rates and especially capital gains and estate tax rates will do little to raise tax payments from the likes of Mr. Trump. No taxable income = no tax at any rate. It will likely have the opposite effect, making more lawyer, accountant, and lobbyist time worthwhile.

The main issue, really, is not what taxes Mr. Trump did or did not pay after the big loss. The big issue is what taxes he did or did not pay beforehand.


If we're going to tax income, the principle of net operating loss carry-forward (this sort of taxese by itself tells you a lot about what's wrong with the system) makes a lot of sense. Suppose you run a business that makes $1,000,000 in even years, and loses $900,000 in odd years. On average, you make $50,000 per year. But if you pay a 40% Federal income tax rate (plus state, local, etc.) in the good years, then you pay $200,000 per year on average in taxes, a 400% tax rate.

So, if Mr. Trump really had earned $1,000,000,000 of income, paid taxes on that income, then lost $900,000,000 as reported, allowing him to deduct future income against that $900,000,000 until he pays taxes only on the net $100,000,000 makes abundant sense. (I'm struggling to keep track of the zeros here.)

Now you see the big issue. The real question is, did Mr. Trump actually make income, pay taxes, and then suffer that $900,000,000 loss? Or, did other people suffer the loss, and Mr. Trump got to use the losses to protect his future income? Or, are the losses basically fictitious?  The reporting (New York Times ) suggests the latter

...net operating loss, or N.O.L., allows a dizzying array of deductions, business expenses, real estate depreciation, losses from the sale of business assets and even operating losses to flow from the balance sheets of those partnerships, limited liability companies and S corporations onto the personal tax returns of men like Mr. Trump.

The  follow up offered more detail on where fictitious or other people's losses come from:

... he might have been able to record write-downs of assets under a doctrine known as “abandonment,” an aggressive accounting tactic used when an investor walks away from a worthless or nearly worthless asset and writes off the entire capital investment in the property. ["The" does not mean "his?"] 

... Mr. Trump personally guaranteed $832 million of debt related to his casinos and other assets. Under tax code provisions available to real estate developers, he could take the full amount as a deduction even if he didn’t invest a dime of his own money. [my emphasis] 

Ordinarily, that deduction would be recaptured when the debt was forgiven or the underlying assets sold. If the debt were forgiven, Mr. Trump would have to report that as income. But there are various exceptions. If Mr. Trump was insolvent at the time — if his debts exceeded his assets — he might have avoided having to report the forgiveness of debt as income...

There are other provisions, too, that might have allowed Mr. Trump to deduct the loans but never have to report them as income. 

Real estate developers are also uniquely able to realize losses as soon as they occur, but defer gains, often indefinitely, through such tactics as like-kind exchanges. “It’s heads Trump wins, and tails the government loses,” Mr. Knoll said.

As a simple version, lunch conversation had the following anecdote: If you rent out property here, you can depreciate the cost of the house. But the cost of the house in the bay area is 99% value of land which doesn't depreciate. So you can cut your taxable income by this fictitious depreciation. I don't know if it's true, but it is a similar story.

Now, for lessons.

Income and corporate taxes.  Compare this outcome to a consumption tax. Suppose that no matter what his income, Mr. Trump had to pay, say, 25% VAT on

...Mr. Trump’s opulent lifestyle over the years. At the nadir of his personal financial crisis in the early 1990s, his lenders put him on an annual “budget” of $450,000 in personal expenses — more than enough to sustain his lifestyle of lavish homes, private jets, country clubs and golf courses 

Assuming that he did not, in fact, pay 40% taxes on the $900,000,000 before he "lost" it, he would have ended up paying a lot more in consumption taxes. A consumption tax can be more progressive than an income tax. The attempt to tax income is at the root of all this mess.

It's not just Trump. The great news of this story is that it shines a light on the affairs of America's "dynastic families" (aristocracy), and the puzzle of why they all seem to be so heavily invested in real estate. From the Times again,

...America’s dynastic families, which, like the Trumps, hold their wealth inside byzantine networks of partnerships, limited liability companies and S corporations.  

...According to Mr. Mitnick, Mr. Trump’s use of net operating losses was no different from that of his other wealthy clients.

“If it wasn’t clear before, it is now: The tax code is tilted toward the rich in its statutory framework, its exceptions, and in how it is enforced and administered,” said Steven M. Rosenthal, a real estate tax specialist and senior fellow at the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center. 

It goes on. A real estate lawyer once explained to me how she set up trusts for one of these "dynastic families." On Junior's first birthday he gets complex shares in a limited partnership worth just under the gift tax limit. 50 years later, what do you know by capital gains it's worth $50 million, so the property passes outside of estate taxes.

What fixes it? Neither candidate's tax plan does anything that I see to eliminate these shenanigans among the super-rich who can afford to hire armies of lawyers. (Correct me if I am wrong, please. I have not read them in great detail as I know they will be shredded on Nov. 7). Mrs. Clinton's plans to raise personal income tax rates doesn't raise more taxes from people who have sheltered all their income. Raising capital gains and estate tax rates just raises the incentive to pursue shelters. (See for example Zuckerberg's GRAT)

The right response to this affair is outrage at the astonishing crony complexity of the tax code, not really Mr. Trump's apparently perfectly legal behavior.  I can't see a way to get around this than to abandon the attempt to tax income, and just tax consumption instead.

As for Mr. Trump, I actually have a kind thing to say: This affair makes it clear that politics is indeed a recent avocation.  You can tell which economists want government jobs and which don't by how they pay their nannies. Nobody planning to run for office would have done this!

Update: Debt Parking by John Hempton (HT Marginal Revolution). Short version: Borrow lots of money. Lose it, take tax loss. Sell worthless debt to offshore entity. Get creditors to forgive debt. Normally, debt forgiveness counts as income and eats back your tax losses. But since that "income" is not cash, it's easy to hide it. The big question will be whether Mr. Trump did this, or whether he later paid taxes on the forgiven debt or not.

Hampton speculates he did not pay that tax:

There is a vehicle out there (say an offshore trust or other undisclosed related party effectively controlled by Donald Trump) - which owns over $900 million in debt and is not bothering to collect it. 

I do not have the time or energy to find that vehicle. But it is there. Now that this blog has gone public journalists are going to look for it. 

There is a Pulitzer prize for whoever finds it. Just give me a nod at the acceptance ceremony

Update 2: Josh Barro writes about a more plausible explanation from Lee Sheppard -- the "Gitlitz loophole." Until 2002, someone in Mr. Trump's position could, in fact, set up a company, borrow a ton of money, lose it, have the debt forgiven in the company's bankruptcy, but use the lost borrowed money against future personal taxes. Apparently, it was an error in writing the tax code, which Congress fixed when it came to light.

I stick to my interpretation that the episode reveals more about insane complexity of the tax code, a necessary result of trying to tax income, than much of anything else.

EconTalk

I did an EconTalk Podcast with Russ Roberts. The general subject is economic growth, the reasons it seems to be slipping away from us and policies (or non-policies) that might help.

As in other recent projects (growth essay, testimony) I'm trying to synthesize, and also to find policies and ways to talk about them that avoid the stale left-right debate, where people just shout base-pleasing spin ever louder. "You're a tax and spend socialist" "You just want tax cuts for your rich buddies" is getting about as far as "You always leave your socks on the floor" "Well, you spend the whole day on the phone to your mother."

We did this as an interview before a live audience, at a Chicago Booth alumni event held at Hoover, so it's a bit lighter than the usual EconTalk. This kind of thought helps the synthesis process a lot for me.  Russ' pointed questions make me think, as did the audience in follow up Q&A (not recorded). Plus, it was fun.

I always leave any interview full of regrets about things I could have said better or differently. The top of the regret pile here was leaving a short joke in response to Russ' question about what the government should spend more on. Russ was kindly teeing up the section of the growth essay "there is good spending" and perhaps "spend more to spend less" ideas in several other recent writings. It would have been a good idea to go there and spend a lot more time on the question.


From the growth essay, I think the government could profitably spend a lot more money on the justice system. That so many of our fellow citizens rot in jail awaiting trials, that the vast majority never receive a trial anyway but a hasty plea-bargain, that their legal representation is so thin, is a disgrace -- and causing huge problems. If a wrongly accused young man spends two years in jail before charges are dropped, the consequences for him and his family are awful. Business relies on a speedy and efficient justice system to adjudicate commercial disputes, and that seems to be falling apart too, partly for lack of resources.  The cost here is peanuts compared to, say, peanut subsidies.

Our public infrastructure doesn't just consist of steel and asphalt. The public software needs investment as well, or more.

Public health is one of the most essential public goods. Of all the civilization-ending scenarios you can think of, nuclear war and a pandemics top my list. Many past pandemics followed a surge in globalization -- the plague of the 1350s, that wiped out half or more of the population; the smallpox that wiped out native America in the 1500s, the 1918 flu. (Larry Summers has a good article on this point.) We are ripe for antibiotics to stop working and new diseases to spread catastrophically, if not among humans among the plants and animals on which we depend. Don't count on the UN and the WHO.

The government can profitably fund basic research. "Yes, 95% of funded research is silly. Yes, the government allocates money inefficiently. Yes, research should also attract private donations. But the 5% that is not silly is often vital, and can produce big breakthroughs." (Basic research is not the same thing as subsidies for commercializing research.)

Yes, Martha, I should have said, there are public goods here and there.

Of course, more spending on things like these does not imply more spending overall. They're all remarkably cheap, and could easily be funded by spending a little less on some of the colossal waste. (Example: We spend $6 billion on the FBI and $13 billion on border control.) Of course, one must also spend wisely and use the results wisely. And one could add a lot to the list. But repeating a fun joke about spending is not the right answer.

Testimony 2

On the way back from Washington, I passed the time reformatting my little essay for the Budget committee to html for blog readers. See below. (Short oral remarks here in the last blog post, and pdf version of this post here.)

I learned a few things while in DC.

The Paul Ryan "A better way" plan is serious, detailed, and you will be hearing a lot about it. I read most of it in preparation for my trip, and it's impressive. Expect reviews here soon. I learned that Republicans seem to be uniting behind it and ready to make a major push to publicize it. It is, by design, a document that Senatorial and Congressional candidates will use to define a positive agenda for their campaigns, as well as describing a comprehensive legislative and policy agenda.

"Infrastructure" is bigger in the conversation than I thought. But since there is no case that potholes caused the halving of America's trend growth rate, do not be surprised if infrastructure fails to double the trend growth rate. It's also a bit sad that the most common growth idea in Washington is, acording to my commenters, about 2,500 years old -- employment on public works.

Washington conversation remains in thrall to the latest numbers. There was lots of buzz at my hearing about a recent census report that median family income was up 5%. Chicagoans used to get excited about the 40 degree February thaw.

The quality can be very very good. Congressman Price, the chair of my session, covered just about every topic in my testimony, and possibly better. Congressional staff are really good, and they are paying attention to the latest. If you write policy-related economics, take heart, they really are listening.

The questions at my hearing pushed me to clarify just how will debt problems affect the average American. What I had not said in the prepared remarks needs to be said. If we don't get an explosion of growth, the US will not be able to make good on its promises to social security, health care, government pensions, credit guarantees, taxpayers, and bondholders. Something's got to give. And the growing size of entitlements means they must give. Even a default on the debt, raising taxes to the long-run Laffer limit, will not pay for current pension and health promises. Those will be cut. The question is how. If we wait to a fiscal crisis, they will be cut unexpectedly and by large amounts, leaving people who counted on them in dire straits. Greece is a good example. If we make sensible sustainable promises now, they will be cut less, and people will have decades to adjust.


Ok, on to html testimony:

Growing Risks to the Budget and the Economy.

Testimony of John H. Cochrane before the House Committee on Budget.

September 14 2016

Chairman Price, Ranking Member Van Hollen, and members of the committee: It is an honor to speak to you today.

I am John H. Cochrane. I am a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University¹. I speak to you today on my own behalf on not that of any institution with which I am affiliated.

Sclerotic growth is our country's most fundamental economic problem.² From 1950 to 2000, our economy grew at 3.6% per year.³ Since 2000, it has grown at barely half that rate, 1.8% per year. Even starting at the bottom of the recession in 2009, usually a period of super-fast catch-up growth, it has grown at just over 2% per year. Growth per person fell from 2.3% to 0.9%, and since the recession has been 1.3%.


The CBO long-term budget analysis⁴ looks out 30 years, and forecasts roughly 2% growth. On current trends that is likely an over-estimate, as it presumes we will have no recessions, or that future recessions will have not have the permanent effects we have seen of the last several recessions. If we grow at 2%, the economy will expand by 82% in 30 years, almost doubling.⁵ But if we can just get back to the 3.6% postwar normal growth rate, the economy will expand by 194%, almost tripling instead. We will add the entire current US economic output to the total. In per-person terms, a 1.3% trend gives the average American 48% more income in 30 years. Reverting to the postwar 2.3% average means 99% more income, twice as much. And economic policy was not perfect in the last half of the 20th century. We should be able to do even better.

Restoring sustained, long-term economic growth is the key to just about every economic and budgetary problem we face.

Nowhere else are we talking about doubling or not the average American's income.⁶

Nowhere else are we talking about doubling or not Federal revenues. Long-term Federal revenues depend almost entirely on economic growth. In 1990, the Federal Government raised $1.6 trillion inflation-adjusted dollars. In 2016, this has doubled to $3.1 trillion. Wow! Did the government double tax rates? No. The overall federal tax rate stayed almost the same -- 18.0% of GDP in 1990, 18.8% of GDP today. Income doubled.

Whether deficits and debt balloon, whether we our government can pay for Social Security and health care, defend the country, and fund other goals such as protecting the environment, depend most crucially on economic growth.

Why has growth halved? Some will tell you that the economy is working as well as it can, but we've just run out of new ideas.⁷ A quick tour of the Silicon Valley makes one suspicious of that claim.

Others will bring you novel and untested economic theories: we suffer an ill-defined "secular stagnation" that requires massive borrowing and spending, even wasted spending. The "multiplier" translating government spending to output is not one and a half, and a temporary expedient which can briefly raise the level of income in a depression, but six or more, enough to finance itself by the larger tax revenues which larger output induces --a proposition long derided of the "supply side" --and it can now kick off long-term growth.⁸ Like 18th century doctors to whom disease was an imbalance of humors, modern macroeconomic doctors have one diagnosis and remedy for all the complex ills that can befall a modern economy: "demand!"

I'm here to tell you the most plausible answer is simple, clear, sensible, and much more difficult. Our legal and regulatory system is slowly strangling the golden goose of growth. There is no single Big Fix. Each market, industry, law, and agency is screwed up in its own particular way, and needs patient reform.

America is middle aged, out of shape and overweight. One voice says: well, get used to it, buy bigger pants. Another voice says: 10 day miracle detox cleanse! I'm here to tell you that the only reliable answer is good old-fashioned diet and exercise.

Or, a better metaphor perhaps: our economy, legal and regulatory system has become like a hoarder's house. No, there isn't a miracle organizer system. We have to patiently clean out every room.

Economic regulation, law and policy all slow growth by their nature. Growth comes from new ideas, new products, new processes, new ways of doing things, and most of these embodied in new companies. And these upend old companies, and displace their workers, both of whom come to Washington pleading that you save them and their jobs. It is a painful process. It is natural that the administration, regulatory agencies, and you, listen and try to protect them. But every time we protect an old company, an old industry, or an old job, from innovation and competition, we slow down growth.

How do we solve this problem and get back to growth? Our national political and economic debate has gotten stale, each side repeating the same base-pleasing talking points, but making no progress persuading the other. Making one or the other points again, or louder, will get us nowhere. I will try, instead, to find policies that think outside of these tired boxes, and that can appeal to all sides of the political spectrum.

Rather than "more government" or "less government," let's focus on fixing government. We need above all a grand simplification of our economic, legal, and political life, so that government does what it does competently and efficiently.

Regulation: fix the process.

"There's too much regulation, we're stifling business. No, there's too little regulation, businesses are hurting people." Or so goes the tired argument. Regulation is strangling business investment, and especially the formation of new businesses. But the main problem with regulation is how it's done, not how much. If we fix regulation, the quantity will take care of itself. We can agree on smarter regulation, better regulation, not just "more" or "less" regulation.⁹

Regulation is too discretionary --you can't read the rules and know what to do, you have to ask for permission granted on regulators' whim. No wonder that the revolving door revolves faster and faster, oiled by more and more money.

Regulatory decisions take forever. Just deciding on the Keystone Pipeline or California's high speed train --I pick examples from left and right on purpose --takes longer than it did to build the transcontinental railroad in the 1860s. By hand.

Regulation has lost rule-of-law protections. You often can't see the evidence, challenge witnesses, or appeal. The agency is cop, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner all rolled in to one. [And, a Congressman pointed out during the discussion, recipient of collected fines.]

Most dangerous of all, regulation and associated legal action are becoming more politicized. Each week brings a new scandal. Last week¹⁰, we learned how the Government shut down ITT tech, but not the well-connected Laureate International. The IRS still targets conservative groups¹¹. The week before, we learned how the company that makes Epi-pens, headed by the daughter of a Senator, got the FDA to block its competitors, Congress to mandate its products, and jacked up the price of an item that costs a few bucks to $600. This is a bi-partisan danger. For example, presidential candidate Donald Trump has already threatened to use the power of the government against people who donate to opponents' campaigns.¹²

America works because you can lose an election, support an unpopular cause, speak out against a policy you disagree with, and this will not bring down the attentions of the IRS, the EPA, the NLRB, the SEC, the CFPB, the DOJ, the FDA, the FTC, the Department of Education, and so forth, who can swiftly put you out of business even if eventually you are proven innocent, or just slow-roll your requests for permissions until you run out of money.

This freedom does not exist in much of the world. The Administrative state is an excellent tool for cementing power. But when people can't afford to lose an election, countries come unglued. Do not let this happen in the US.

Congress can take back its control of the regulatory process. Write no more thousand-page bills with vague authorizations. Fight back hard when agencies exceed their authorization. Insist on objective and retrospective cost benefit analysis. Put in rule-of law protections, including discovery of how agencies make decisions. Insist on strict timelines --if an agency takes more than a year to rule on a request, it's granted. [I later learned this is called a "shot clock" in Washington, a nice metaphor.]

Health care and finance are the two biggest new regulatory headaches. The ACA and Dodd-Frank aren't working, and are important drags on employment and economic growth. Simple workable alternatives exist. Implement them.

The real health care problem is not how we pay for health care, but the many restrictions on its supply and competition.¹³ If hospitals were as competitive as airlines, they would work darn hard to heal us at much lower --and disclosed! --prices. If the FDA did not strangle new medicines and devices, even generics, prices would fall.

Competition is always the best disinfectant, guarantor of good service and low prices. Yet almost all uncompetitive markets in the US are uncompetitive because some law or regulation keeps competitors out.

Rather than guarantee bank debts, and unleash an army of regulators to make sure banks don't risk too much, we should instead insist that banks get their money in ways that do not risk crises, primarily issuing equity and long-term debt. Then banks can fail just like other companies, and begin to compete just like other companies.¹⁴

"The planet is dying, control carbon!" "Your crony energy boondoggles and regulations are killing the economy!" Well, that argument is not getting us anywhere, is it? The answer is straightforward: A simple carbon tax in exchange for elimination of all the growth-killing, intrusive, cronyist, and ineffective micromanagement. We can continue to argue about the rate of that tax, but it will both reduce more carbon, and increase more growth, than the current ineffective policies --and stagnant debate.

None of these recommendations are ideological or partisan. These are just simple, clean-out-the-junk, workable ways to get our regulatory system to actually work, for its goal of protecting consumers and the environment, at minimal economic and political damage.

Social programs: Fix the incentives.

"Cut spending, or the debt will balloon!" "Raise spending or people will die in the streets!" That's getting nowhere too. And it ignores central problems.

In many social programs, if you earn an extra dollar, you lose a dollar or more of benefits. Many programs have cliffs, especially in health care and disability, where earning one extra dollar triggers an enormous loss. Even when one program cuts benefits modestly with income, the interaction of many programs makes work impossible.¹⁵ No wonder that people become trapped. We need to fix these disincentives. Doing so will help people better. If we fix the incentives, though it may look like we spend more, in the end we will spend less --and encourage economic growth as well as opportunity.

Spend more to spend less. "Spending is out of control! We need to spend less or there will be a debt crisis!" "Oh there you go being heartless again. We need to invest more in programs that help Americans in need." I feel like I'm at a dinner party hosted by a couple in a bad marriage. This isn't getting us anywhere.

It is important to limit Federal spending. However, we tend to just limit the appearance of spending by moving the same activities off the books. Off-the-books spending does the same economic damage. Or more.

For example, we allow an income tax deduction for mortgage interest, in order to subsidize homeownership. From an economic point of view, this is exactly the same thing as collecting higher taxes, and then sending checks to homeowners. It looks like we're taxing and spending less than we really are. But from an economic growth point of view, it's the same thing.

Actually, it's worse, because it adds unfairness and inefficiency. Suppose a colleague proposes a bill to you: The U.S. Treasury will send checks to homeowners, but high income people get much bigger checks, as will people who borrow a lot, and people who refinance often and take cash out. People with low incomes, who save up to buy houses, or don't refinance, get a lot less. You would say, "You're out of your mind!" But that's exactly what the mortgage interest deduction achieves!

If we were to eliminate the mortgage deduction, and put housing subsidies on budget, where taxpayers can see where their money is going, the resulting homeowner subsidy would surely be a lot smaller, much more progressive, helping lower income people, better targeted at getting people in houses, and less damaging of savings and economic growth. Both Republicans and Democrats should rejoice. Except the headline amount of taxing and spending will increase. Well, spend more to spend less.

We allow a tax deduction for charitable deductions. This is exactly the same thing as taxing more, but then sending checks to non-profits as matching contributions --but much larger checks for contributions from rich people than from poorer people. Then, many "non-profits" spend a lot of money on private jet travel, executive salaries, and political activities. Actual on-budget federal spending, convoluted and inefficient as it is, at least has a modicum of oversight and transparency. If we removed the deduction, but subsidized worthy charities, with transparency and oversight, we'd do a lot more good, and probably overall tax less and spend less. Except the headline amount of taxing and spending might increase. Well, spend more to spend less.

Mandates are the same thing as taxing and spending. Many European countries tax a lot, and then provide services, like health insurance. We mandate that employers provide health insurance. It looks like we're taxing and spending less, but we're not. A health insurance mandate has exactly the same economic effects as a $15,000 head tax on each employee, financing a $15,000 health insurance voucher.

Economics pays no heed to budget tricks. Spending too much rhetorical effort on lowering taxes and spending induces our government to such tricks, with the same growth-destroying effects. If you want economic growth, treat every mandate as taxing and spending.

Taxes: break up the argument.

The outlines of tax reform have been plain for a long time: lower marginal rates, broaden the base by getting rid of the massive welter of special deals. But it can't get done. Why not?

When we try to fix taxes,¹⁶ we argue about four things at once: 1) What is the right structure for a tax code? 2) What is the right level of taxes, and therefore, of spending? 3) What activities should the government subsidize -- home mortgages, charitable contributions, electric cars, and so on? 4) How much should the government redistribute income?

Tax reforms fail because we argue about all these together. For example, the Bowles-Simpson commission got to an improvement on the structure of taxes, but then the reform effort fell apart when the Administration wanted more revenue and congressional Republicans less.

I am back at my dysfunctional dinner party. Sometimes, in politics as in marriage, it is wise to bundle issues together, each side accepting a minor loss to ensure what they see as a major gain. You clean up your socks, I'll clean up my makeup. Sometimes, however, we bundle too many issues together, and the result is paralysis, as each side vetoes a package of improvements over a small issue. Then, it's better to work on the issues separately.

So, let's fix taxes by separating these four issues, in four commissions possibly, or better in four completely separate sections of law.

1) Structure. Agree on the right structure of the tax code, with its only goal to raise revenue at minimal economic distortion, but leave the rates blank.

2) Rates. Determine the rates, without touching the structure of the tax code. A good tax code should last decades. Rates may change every year, and likely will be renegotiated every four. But those who want higher or lower rates know they can agree on the structure of the tax code.

3) Separate the subsidy code from the tax code. Mortgage interest subsidies? Electric car subsidies? Sure, we'll talk about them, but separately. Then, we don't have to muck up raising revenue for the government with subsidies, and the budgetary and economic impact of subsidies can be evaluated on their own merits

4) Separate the redistribution code from the tax code. Then we don't muck up raising revenue for the government with income transfers.

The main point is that by separating these four elements of law, each with fundamentally different purposes, we are much more likely to make coherent progress on each. You need not oppose beneficial aspects of an economically efficient tax simplification, say, if you wish to have a greater level of redistribution --well, at least any more than you might oppose any random bill in order to force your way on that issue.

Some thoughts on how each of these might work:

Structure. The economic damage of taxation is entirely about "marginal'' rates --if you earn an extra dollar, how much do you get to enjoy it, after all taxes, federal, state, local, sales, estate, and so forth. Economics has really little to say about how much taxes people pay. The economists' ideal is a tax system in which people pay as much as the Government needs --but each extra dollar earned is tax-free. Politics, of course, focuses pretty much on the opposite, how much people pay and ignoring the economically-distorting margins.

Thus, if you ask 100 economists, "now, forget politics for a moment --that's our job --and tell me what the right tax code is, with the only objective being to raise revenue without distorting the economy,'' the pretty universal answer will be a consumption tax --with no corporate tax, income tax, tax on savings or rates of return, estates, or anything else, and essentially no deductions. (They will then say "but..." and go on to demand subsidies and income redistribution, at which time you have to assure them too that we'll discuss these separately.)

A massive simplification of the tax code is, in my opinion, as or more important than the rates --and it's something we're more likely to agree on. America's tax code is an obscenely complex cronyist nightmare.

For example, that's why I favor, and you should seriously consider, eliminating the corporate tax. Corporations never pay any taxes. All money they send to the government comes from higher prices, lower wages, or lower returns to shareholders --and mostly the former two. If you tax people who receive corporate profits, rather than collecting taxes from higher prices and lower wages, you will have a more progressive tax system.

But more importantly, if you eliminate the corporate tax, you will eliminate the constant stream of lobbyists in your offices each day asking for special favors.

Far too many businesses are structured around taxes, and far too many smart minds are spending their time devising corporate tax avoidance schemes and lobbying strategies. A much simpler tax code even with sharply higher rates --but very clear rates, that we all know about and can plan on --may well have less economic distortion than a massively complex code, with high statutory rates, but a welter of complex schemes and deductions that result in lower taxes.

Subsidy code. Tax expenditures --things like deductions for mortgage interest, employer provided health care, charitable contributions, and the $10,000 credit my wealthy Palo Alto neighbor got from the taxpayers for buying a Tesla -- are estimated at $1.4 trillion,¹⁷ compare with $3.5 trillion Federal Receipts and $4 trillion Federal Expenditures.¹⁸ Our Federal Government is really a third larger than it looks.

While the subsidy code could consist of a separate discussion of tax expenditures, it would be far better for the rules of the subsidy code to be: all subsidies must be on budget, where we can all see what's going on.

Redistribution. Even a consumption tax can be as progressive as one wants. One can use the regular income tax code with full deduction of savings and omitting capital income, thus taxing high consumption at higher rates and low consumption at lower rates.

Again, however, it might well be more efficient to integrate income redistribution with social programs. Put it on budget, and send checks to people. Yes, that makes spending look larger, but sending a check is the same thing as giving a tax break. And spending can be more carefully monitored.

Infrastructure

Infrastructure is all the rage¹⁹. America needs infrastructure. Good infrastructure, purchased at minimum cost, that passes objective cost-benefit criteria, built promptly, can help the economy in the long run. Soft infrastructure --a better justice system, for example --matters as much as hard infrastructure --more asphalt.

However, there is no case that the halving of America's growth rate in the last 20 years is centrally due to potholes and rusting bridges. Poor infrastructure is not the cause of sclerosis, so already one should be wary of infrastructure investment as the central plan to cure that sclerosis.

The claim that infrastructure spending will lift the economy out of its doldrums lies on the "multiplier" effect, that any spending, even wasted, is good for the economy. That is a dubious proposition, especially when the task is to raise the economy by tens of trillions, over decades.

Modern infrastructure is built by machines, and not many people; even less people who do not have the specialized skills. A Freeway in California will do little to help employment of a high school dropout in New York, or a middle-aged mortgage broker in New Jersey. Neither knows how to operate a grader.

The problem with infrastructure is not lack of money. President Obama inaugurated a nearly trillion dollar stimulus plan 8 years ago. His Administration found out there are few shovel-ready projects in America today. They're all tied up waiting for historic review, environmental review, and legal challenges.

The problem with infrastructure is a broken process. Put a time limit on historic, environmental, and other reviews. Require serious, objective, and retrospective cost-benefit analysis. Repeal Davis-Bacon and other contracting requirements that send costs soaring. If the point is infrastructure it should be infrastructure, not passing money around. You ought to be able to agree on more money in return for assurance that the money is wisely spent.

Debt and deficits

This hearing is also about budgets and debts, which I have left to the end. Yes, our deficits are increasing. Yes, every year the Congressional Budget Office declares our long-term promises unsustainable.

I have not emphasized this problem, though in my opinion it is centrally important, and I think I was invited here to say so.

Recognize that computer simulations with hockey-stick debt, designed to frighten into submission a supporter of what he or she feels is necessary government spending, are as ineffective as computer simulations with hockey-stick temperatures, designed to frighten into submission a supporter of current economic growth and skeptic of draconian energy regulation. Yelling about each, louder, is not going to be productive.

And there are many voices who tell you debt is not a problem. Interest rates are at record lows. Why not borrow more, and worry about paying it back later? So, let me offer a few out of the box observations, and suggestions that you might agree on.

It is useful to clarify why debt is a problem. The case that large debts will slowly and inexorably push up interest rates, and crowd out investment, is hard to make in this era of ultra-low rates. Debt does place a burden of repayment on our children and grandchildren, but if we have reasonable economic growth they will be wealthier than we are.

The biggest danger that debt poses is a crisis.

Debt crises, like all crises that really threaten an economy and society, do not come with decades of warning. Do not expect slowly rising interest rates to canary the coalmine. Even Greece could borrow at remarkably low rates. Until, one day, it couldn't, with catastrophic results.

The fear for the US is similar. We will have long years of low rates. Until, someday, it is discovered that some books are cooked, and somebody owes a lot of money that they can't pay back, and people start to question debts everywhere.

For example, suppose Chinese debts blow up, and southern Europe as well. Both Europe and China will start selling Treasury debt quickly. Suppose at the same time that student loans, state and local pensions, and state governments are blowing up, along with some large U.S. companies, and banks under deposit insurance. A recession looms, which the US will want to fight with fiscal stimulus. The last crisis occasioned about $5 trillion of extra borrowing. The next one could double that.

So, the U.S. needs to quickly borrow additional trillions of dollars, while its major customers --foreign central banks --are selling. In addition, the U.S. borrows relatively short term. Each year, the U.S. borrows about $7 trillion to pay off $7 trillion of maturing debt, and then more to cover the deficit.

Imagine all this happens 10 years from now, with social security and medicare unresolved and increasing deficits. The CBO is still issuing its annual warnings that our debt is unsustainable. Now, bond investors are willing to lend to the US government so long as they think someone else will lend tomorrow to pay off their loans today. When they suspect that isn't true, they pull back and interest rates spike.

But our large debts leave our fiscal position sensitive to interest rate rises. At 100% debt to GDP ratio, if interest rates rise to just 5%, that means the deficit rises by 5 percentage points of GDP, or approximately $1 Trillion extra dollars per year. If bond investors were worried about sustainability already, an extra trillion a year of deficits makes it worse. So they demand even higher interest rates. Debt that is easily financed at 1% rates is not sustainable at 5% rates and a catastrophe at 10% rates --if you have a large debt outstanding.

This is a big part of what happened to Greece and nearly happened to Italy. At low interest rates, they are solvent. At high interest rates, they are not.

Debt crises are like an earthquakes. It's always quiet. People laugh at you for worrying. Buying insurance seems like a waste of money. Until it isn't.

So, the way to think about the dangers of debt is not like a predictable problem that comes to us slowly. View the issue as managing a small risk of a catastrophic problem, like a war or pandemic.

The easy answers are straightforward. Sensible reforms to Social Security and Medicare are on the table. Fix the indexing, improve the incentives for older people to keep working. Convert medicare to a premium support policy.

The harder problems are those less recognized. Underfunded pensions, widespread credit guarantees, and explicit or implicit too big to fail guarantees add tinder to the fire. Dry powder and good credit are invaluable.

Above all, undertake a pro-growth economic policy. We grew out of larger debts after World War II; we can do that again.

You can also buy some insurance. Every American household that takes out a mortgage faces the choice: fixed rate, or variable rate? The fixed rate is a little higher. But it can't go up, no matter what happens. The variable rate starts out lower. But if interest rates rise, you might not be able to make the payments, and you might lose the house. That is what happens to countries in a debt crisis.

For the US, this decision is made by the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve. The Treasury has been gently lengthening the maturity of its borrowings. The Federal Reserve has been neatly undoing that effort.

Both Treasury and Fed need direction from Congress. The Treasury does not regard managing risks to the budget posed by interest rate rises as a central part of its job, and the Fed does not even consider this fact. Congress needs to decide who is in charge of the maturity structure of US debt, and guide the Treasury. I hope that guidance leans towards the fixed rate plan. By issuing long-term debt --I argue in fact for perpetuities, that simply pay a $1 coupon forever with no fixed roll over date -- and engaging in simple swap transactions that every bank uses to manage interest rate risk, the U.S. can isolate itself from a debt crisis very effectively.²⁰ But at least ask that fixed or floating interest rate question and make a decision.

As I have warned against focusing too much attention on on-budget spending, so let me warn against too much attention on deficits rather than spending. If you focus on debt and deficits, the natural inclination is to raise tax rates. Europe's experience in the last few years argues against "austerity" in the form of sharply higher tax rates, as always adding to the disincentive to hire, invest, or start innovative businesses.

Concluding comments

I have sketched some novel and radical-sounding approaches to restoring robust economic growth. Economic growth, together with commonsense fiscal discipline are keys to solving our budget problems.

This is not pie in the sky. These are simple straightforward steps, none controversial as a matter of economics. And there really is no alternative. Ask of other approaches: Does this at all plausibly diagnose why America's growth rate has fallen in half? Does the cure at all plausibly address the diagnosis? Is the cure based on a reasonable causal channel that you can actually explain to a constituent? Does the cure have a ghost of a chance of having a large enough effect to really make a difference?

You may object that fundamental reform is not "politically feasible." Well, what's "politically feasible" can change fast in this country. This is an exciting time politically. The people are mad as hell, and they're not taking it any more. They are ready for fundamental changes.

Furthermore, it is time for Congress to take the lead. These are properly Congressional matters, and no matter who wins the Presidential election you are unlikely to see leadership in this direction.

Winston Churchill once said that Americans can be trusted to do the right thing after we've tried everything else. [NB: apparently this is an urban legend. Oh well, it's a good quip if not a quote] Well, we've tried everything else. It's time to prove him right.

------

<sup>1. You can find a full CV, a list of all affiliations, and a catalog of written work at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/index.htm. ↩

2.This testimony summarizes several recent essays. On growth and for an overview, see "Economic Growth." 2016. In John Norton Moore, ed., The Presidential Debates Carolina Academic Press p. 65-90. http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/cochrane_growth.pdf; "Ending America's Slow-Growth Tailspin." Wall Street Journal, May 3 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/ending-americas-slow-growth-tailspin-1462230818, and "Ideas for Renewing American Prosperity" Wall Street Journal July 4 2014. http://online.wsj.com/articles/ideas-for-renewing-american-prosperity-1404777194. ↩

3. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPCA, Continuously compounded annual rates of growth. Per capita https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A939RX0Q048SBEA ↩

4. https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51580-LTBO-2.pdf ↩

5. 100*exp(30 x 0.02) = 182. 100*exp(30*0.035) = 286. ↩

6. As an example of agreement on the fundamental importance of growth among economists of all political leanings, see Larry Summers, "The Progressive Case for Championing Pro-Growth Policies," 2016. http://larrysummers.com/2016/08/08/the-progressive-case-for-championing-pro-growth-policies/ ↩

7. For an excellent recent exposition of this view, see Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War. Princeton University Press 2016. http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10544.html ↩

8. An influential example of these views, including self-financing stimulus: J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers, "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Spring 2012. https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/fiscal-policy-in-a-depressed-economy/. Interestingly, DeLong and Summers condition their view on interest rates stuck at zero, a cautionary limitation that current stimulus advocates seem to have forgotten. ↩

9. See "Rule of Law in the Regulatory State." 2015. http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/ rule_of_law_and_regulation essay.pdf ↩

10. http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-clinton-for-profit-college-standard-1473204250 ↩

11. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/7/irs-refuses-to-abandon-targeting-criteria-used-aga/ ↩

12. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/02/22/trump-ricketts-family-better-careful/80761060/ ↩

13. See "After the ACA: Freeing the market for health care." 2015. In Anup Malani and Michael H. Schill, Eds. The Future of Healthcare Reform in the United States, p. 161-201, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/after_aca_published.pdf ↩

14. See "Toward a run-free financial system." 2014. In Across the Great Divide: New Perspectives on the Financial Crisis, Martin Neil Baily and John B. Taylor, Editors, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, p. 197-249. http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/across-the-great-divide-ch10.pdf, and "A Blueprint for Effective Financial Reform." 2016. In George P. Shultz, ed, Blueprint for America Hoover Institution Press, p. 71 - 84. http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/george_shultz_blueprint_for_america_ch7.pdf ↩

15. See Casey Mulligan The Redistributon Recession, Oxford University Press 2012. ↩

16. See "Here's what genuine tax reform looks like." Wall Street Journal, December 23 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/heres-what-genuine-tax-reform-looks-like-1450828827 ↩

17. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives Table 14; http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-tax-expenditure-budget ↩

18. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA ↩

19. See "The Clinton Plan's Growth Deficit." Wall Street Journal, August 12 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-clinton-plans-growth-deficit-1470957720. Also, for an excellent and well documented review of these issues, see Edward L. Glaeser, 2016, "If you Build it..." City Journal, Summer 2016, http://www.city-journal.org/html/if-you-build-it-14606.html ↩

20. For more details see: A New Structure For U. S. Federal Debt." 2015. In David Wessel, Ed., The $13 Trillion Question: Managing the U.S. Government's Debt, pp. 91-146. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. https://www.brookings.edu/book/the-13-trillion-question/ and http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/Cochrane_US_Federal_Debt.pdf. For a clear analysis of the problem, that recommends the opposite action --shortening the maturity structure to take advantage of low rates --see Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson, Joshua S. Rudolph, and Lawrence H. Summers, "The Optimal Maturity of Government Debt" and "Debt Management Conflicts between the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve," also in David Wessel, Ed., The $13 Trillion Question: Managing the U.S. Government's Debt.↩</sup>

Testimony

I was invited to testify at a hearing of the House budget committee on Sept 14. It's nothing novel or revolutionary, but a chance to put my thoughts together on how to get growth going again, and policy approaches that get past the usual partisan squabbling. Here are my oral remarks. (pdf version here.) The written testimony, with lots of explanation and footnotes, is here. (pdf) (Getting footnotes in html is a pain.)

Chairman Price, Ranking Member Van Hollen, and members of the committee: It is an honor to speak to you today.

Sclerotic growth is our country’s most fundamental economic problem. If we could get back to the three and half percent postwar average, we would, in the next 30 years, triple rather than double the size of the economy—and tax revenues, which would do wonders for our debt problem.

Why has growth halved? The most plausible answer is simple and sensible: Our legal and regulatory system is slowly strangling the golden goose of growth.

How do we fix it? Our national political and economic debate just makes the same points again, louder, and going nowhere. Instead, let us look together for novel and effective policies that can appeal to all sides.

Regulation:


Let’s get past “too much” or “too little” regulation, and fix regulation instead.

Regulation is too discretionary – people can’t read the rules and know what to do. Regulatory decisions take forever. Regulation has lost rule-of-law protections. Agencies are cop, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner all rolled in to one. Most dangerous of all, regulation is becoming more politicized.

Congress can fix this.

Social programs

Let’s get past spending “more” or “less” on social programs, and fix them instead.

Often, if you earn an extra dollar, you lose more than a dollar of benefits. No wonder people get stuck. If we fix these disincentives, we will help people better, encourage growth and opportunity--and in the end we will spend less.

Spend more to spend less.

Spending is a serious problem. But moving spending off the books does not help.

For example, we allow a mortgage interest tax deduction. This is exactly the same as collecting taxes, and sending checks to homeowners – but larger checks for high income people, people who borrow a lot, and people who refinance often.

Suppose we eliminate the mortgage deduction, and put housing subsidies on budget. The resulting homeowner subsidy would surely be a lot smaller, help lower-income people a lot more, and be better targeted at getting people in houses.

The budget would look bigger. But we would really spend less -- and grow more.

Taxes

Tax reform fails because arguments over the level of taxes, subsidies, or redistribution torpedo sensible simplifications. We could achieve tax reform by separating its four confounding issues.

First, determine the structure of taxes, to raise revenue with minimal economic damages, but leave the rates blank. Separately negotiate the rates. Put all tax incentives in a separate subsidy code, preferably as visible on-budget expenditures. Add a separate income-redistribution code. Then necessary big fights over each element need not derail the others.

A massive simplification of the tax code is, I think, more important than the rates – and easier for us to agree on.

Debt and deficits

Each year the CBO correctly declares our long-term debt unsustainable. Yelling louder won’t work.

First, let’s face the big problem: a debt crisis, when the U.S. suddenly needs to borrow a lot and roll over debts, and markets refuse. This, not a slow predictable rise in interest rates and crowding out, strikes me as the biggest problem.  Crises are always sudden and unexpected, like earthquakes and wars. Even Greece could borrow at remarkably low rates. Until, one day, it couldn’t.

The answers are straightforward. Sensible reforms to Social Security and Medicare are on the table. Address underfunded pensions, widespread credit and bailout guarantees.

Buy some insurance. Like every homeowner shopping for a mortgage, the US chooses between a floating rate, lower initially, and a fixed rate, higher initially, but forever insulating the budget from interest rate risks, which are the essential ingredient of a debt crisis. Direct the Treasury and Fed to buy the fixed rate.

Above all, undertake this simple, pro-growth economic policy, and grow out of debt.

Concluding comments

You may object that fundamental reform is not “politically feasible.” Well, what’s “politically feasible” changes fast these days.

Winston Churchill once said that Americans can be trusted to do the right thing, after we’ve tried everything else. Well, we’ve tried everything else. It’s time to do the right thing.

Glaeser and Summers on Infrastructure

Ed Glaeser has a superb essay on infrastructure at City Journal, titled "If you Build It.." I have a few excerpts, but do go and enjoy the whole thing. Larry Summers also has a new blog post on infrastructure, with some fascinating bits if you read carefully. I wrote about some of these issues in the WSJ and recent post, but not with Ed's clarity and erudition, nor Larry's imprimatur.

Glaeser starts with a clear summary paragraph:

While infrastructure investment is often needed when cities or regions are already expanding, too often it goes to declining areas that don’t require it and winds up having little long-term economic benefit. As for fighting recessions, which require rapid response, it’s dauntingly hard in today’s regulatory environment to get infrastructure projects under way quickly and wisely. Centralized federal tax funding of these projects makes inefficiencies and waste even likelier, as Washington, driven by political calculations, gives the green light to bridges to nowhere, ill-considered high-speed rail projects, and other boondoggles. America needs an infrastructure renaissance, but we won’t get it by the federal government simply writing big checks. A far better model would be for infrastructure to be managed by independent but focused local public and private entities and funded primarily by user fees, not federal tax dollars

Ed documents well my own doubts that infrastructure spending will do much for the economy as a whole, especially in the short run. Buy the infrastructure for the infrastructure, at lowest possible cost -- not for the "jobs" or on the idea this is the key to returning to growth. Annoying as they may be, there is no case that US GDP growth has been cut in half because there are too many potholes. The Hillary Clinton plan included a praiseworthy -- and  novel, considering her party's years of opposition to freeway building -- proposal to cut commuting times. But

What about the economic value of the shorter commuting times that new infrastructure can bring? ... it’s hard to see how substantially reducing time lost to traffic congestion will turbocharge the economy. Imagine that America gets its act together and cuts traffic time sufficiently to save $80 billion—a pretty miraculous improvement. That would still represent less than one-half of 1 percent of America’s $18 trillion GDP....Transportation infrastructure isn’t a solution for America’s lackluster growth rates

The idea of public works to boost the economy goes back, I think, to the Romans, but I'm glad to read just how fresh an idea it is in America:

The idea of using infrastructure building as a weapon against unemployment first entered American politics after the economic panic of 1893. Before that recession hit, in 1891, businessman and Ohio politician Jacob Coxey drafted his “Good Roads Bill.” Coxey wanted the government to spend at least $20 million per month building roads across America, paying workers “at least 80 percent above the going hourly rate.” This building campaign, he argued, would be financed by the printing press—Coxey was a pro-inflation Greenback Party member—and would hike government spending by 75 percent. 

Fiscal expansion financed by helicopter drops remains the cutting edge of Keynesian policy macroeconomics. Keynes once said that "Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist." It sees instead that practical policy Keynesian economists who believe themselves a vanguard of intellectual influence are usually the slaves of some defunct politician! It's a more general problem when economics comes to the service of policies decided for other reasons.

On the stimulus aspect of infrastructure, I have long been suspicious. The Keynesian argument for stimulus works for wasted spending just as well as infrastructure. That you have to wrap it in something nice to get it past the rubes who will not believe that wasted spending is a good thing suggests faith in the idea is not as strong as it should be. Anyway, Ed takes this on with precision

... one should be wary of drawing infrastructure-related lessons from the 1930s for the twenty-first century. .. While a sensible anti-unemployment policy targets resources at areas that have high unemployment rates, many of those areas are today in long-term decline, and the last thing they need is new roads and bridges... 

...The relatively simple technology of infrastructure construction of the 1930s meant that the unskilled unemployed could easily be put to work building roads. Among the iconic images of the Great Depression are scores of men wielding shovels and picks. That isn’t how roads and bridges are built anymore, though. Big infrastructure requires fancy equipment and skilled engineers, who aren’t likely to be unemployed. The most at-risk Americans, if they’re working at all, usually toil in fast-food restaurants, where the average worker makes $22,000 a year. They’re typically not trained to labor on complex civil-construction projects. Subsidizing Big Mac consumption would be a more effective way to provide jobs for the temporarily unemployed than subsidizing airport renovation.

My emphasis because it's such a great quote. It also holds for the permanently unemployed, low-skilled or not construction union members.

The building process was also much quicker in the past, meaning that projects proposed during the Depression could be started and even finished during the Depression, making them more likely to fight temporary joblessness. Robert Moses built the Triborough Bridge complex, the construction of which got under way on Black Friday in October 1929, in just four years. Such speed is hard to imagine today. Boston’s Big Dig, to take one famous example, took 25 years from initial planning to its final completion in 2007. 

It took 6 years to build the transcontinental railroad in the 1860s. By hand.

Why have transportation projects become so much slower? Yes, they’re usually more technologically complicated, but much of the time, politics is also to blame. ... To erect the Triborough, Moses could just demolish the buildings that he needed to get out of the way—neighborhood complaints be damned. Such tactics are no longer politically acceptable, so the Big Dig and other large-scale undertakings needed painstakingly to avoid inconveniencing anybody, dramatically raising costs and delays. New Deal projects also didn’t face environmental-impact reviews, which can add years to a project timeline. Detroit’s Gordie Howe International Bridge’s review process took “four years of consultations, public hearings, traffic analyses, and environmental studies,” to take a recent example. The project should be finished around 2020—15 years after that review process began.

Ed closes with an important point. Just why are roads and bridges, today, financed by Federal tax money? Groceries are funded by the money of people who buy them. In the past, roads and bridges were public goods -- it was not practical to charge users. Now, electronics make real-time, congestion-contingent tolling practical on city streets.

Many tasks of government have nothing in common with private enterprise. Neither our military nor our courts should be in the business of extracting revenues from, respectively, foreign powers or litigants. Aid to the poor and to the elderly is meant to be money-losing. But infrastructure is different and has much more in common with ordinary businesses. After all, infrastructure provides valuable services, the use of which by one individual typically crowds out the use by someone else. E-ZPass technology has made it simple to charge for transportation. Why not, then, establish a business model for transportation infrastructure?

Back from Free-Market Nirvana, Larry Summers' latest blog post has a predictably strong argument for infrastructure investment along the lines of the Hilary Clinton plan, multiplied by about a factor of 10. But he has some wise and important words of caution as well:

How can we be sure investment is carried out efficiently? There is legitimate scepticism about this, and there is no silver bullet for this problem. ... progressive advocates of more investment should compromise with conservative sceptics and, in the context of increased spending, accept regulatory streamlining, as well as requirements that projects undergo cost-benefit analysis. Minimising cost should be the objective of infrastructure procurement.

This is a very important statement. Me, in the WSJ,

In return for more spending, Mrs. Clinton could have offered serious structural reforms: repeal of Davis-Bacon, time limits on environmental reviews, serious cost-benefit analysis, and so forth. Such a package would have been irresistible 

It's nice to agree. But minimizing cost is a breathaking proposition in American politics. A good acid test for infrastructure fans: Suppose a Chinese company offers to build your high speed train at half the cost. Do you say yes? If no, you're not really serious about infrastructure. Larry just said yes.

Larry also takes on the private sector issue,

What about the private sector? ...Policy frameworks that streamline regulatory decision-making and reduce uncertainty could spur investment in these sectors. There is a case for experimenting with mobilising private capital for use on infrastructure that has been a public-sector preserve, such as airports and roads. But, the reality that government borrowing costs are much lower than the returns demanded by private-sector infrastructure investors should lead to caution. It would be unfortunate if, in an effort to avoid deficits, large subsidies were given to private financial operators. Only when private-sector performance in building and operating infrastructure is likely to be better than what the public sector can do is there a compelling argument for privatisation.

Anytime someone uses a passive locution so convoluted as "experimenting with mobilising private capital," I suggest you react as you would to "Ladies and Gentlemen, a band of pickpockets has been discovered working the room." Precisely for the reasons laid out in Larry's last sentence: "Public-Private partnerships" usually mean public protection, private profits, and a piñata for politicians.

Micro vs. Macro

The cause of sclerotic growth is the major economic policy question of our time. The three big explanations are 1) We ran out of ideas (Gordon); 2) Deficient "demand," remediable by more fiscal stimulus (Summers, say) 3); Death by a thousand cuts of cronyist regulation and legal economic interference.

On the latter, we mostly have stories and some estimates for individual markets, not easy-to-use  government-provided statistics. But there are lots of stories.

Here is one day's Wall Street Journal reading while waiting for a plane last Saturday:

1) Holman Jenkins,

... unbridled rent seeking.  That’s the term economists use for exercising government power to create private gains for political purposes. 

Channelling Jefferson,

Mr. Obama’s bank policy dramatically consolidated the banking industry, which the government routinely sues for billions of dollars, with the proceeds partly distributed to Democratic activist groups. 

His consumer-finance agency manufactured fake evidence of racism against wholesale auto lenders in order to facilitate a billion-dollar shakedown.

 His airline policy, urged by labor unions, led to a major-carrier oligopoly, with rising fares and profits. 

His FDA is seeking to extinguish small e-cigarette makers for the benefit of Big Tobacco and Big Pharma (whose smoking-cessation franchise is threatened by cheap and relatively safe electronic cigarettes). 

His National Labor Relations Board, by undermining the power of independent franchisees, is working to cartelize the fast-food industry for the benefit of organized labor.

Summing up,

We could go on. Mr. Obama’s own Council of Economic Advisers complains about the increasing cartelization of the U.S. economy—as if this were not a natural output of regulation. In a much-noted Harvard Business Review piece this spring, James Bessen, an economist, lawyer and software entrepreneur, cites increased “political rent seeking” to explain the puzzle of rising corporate profits in the absence of job creation and economic growth.

The truth is, government playing neutral arbiter over the private economy doesn’t produce rents. A stable and predictable regulatory system produces only mingy or non-existent rents.

2) Uber class action buffet

Federal judge Edward Chen on Thursday rejected a $100 million settlement in a class action alleging that Uber misclassified drivers as independent contractors. That’s a big pot of cash, but the judge says the ride-hailing company can be raided for billions more....Judge Chen complained, however, that the settlement required class members to drop all employment-related claims (e.g., minimum wage, rest and meal breaks and workers’ compensation) ...he settlement would have pre-empted at least 15 lawsuits for employment-related claims as well as cases “before various administrative bodies such as the NLRB.”...the settlement would have scotched lawsuits brought under California’s Private Attorneys General Act—known among businesses as the “bounty hunter law”—that lets private attorneys litigate labor, safety and health code violations on behalf of the state. California pays the lawyers’ fees and keeps 75% of the bounty. The state’s Labor & Workforce Development Agency carped that the statutory penalties against Uber could exceed $1 billion.  

Uber brings flexible employment to thousands, and dramatically better and cheaper rides to consumers and businesses. Whatever you think of contractors vs. employees, nothing in this improves productivity and economic growth, or encourages the needed massive investment towards self-driving ubers.

3) You don't need a dentist to fill a cavity Whether (cheaper, less licensed) dental therapists will be allowed to provide basic services especially in poor areas where there are no dentists.

4) How Obama’s FDA Keeps Generic Drugs Off the Market

 One of the biggest factors fueling the angst over drug prices in the U.S. is that some older medicines that should be sold cheaply as generics are still priced very high, often owing to a dwindling number of generic competitors ..in recent years the Food and Drug Administration has imposed on generic firms many of the same costly requirements that the agency applies to branded-drug makers.  

In 2003...we estimated that it cost less than $1 million for a firm to file a generic-drug application. ...Today, filing a generic application requires an average of about $5 million and can cost as much as $15 million.... 

For generics filed in 2009, the median review time exceeds three years. Yet generics launched in 2015 took about four years for the FDA to approve, since less than 2% of applications were approved on their first submission.    

A new FDA draft regulation...would force the generics to clutter their drug labels with defensive advisories to avoid “failure to warn” lawsuits. Legal fees stemming from the regulation would add over $5 billion to annual health-care costs, rising to $8.6 billion by 2024, ...

And this is just one morning's reading of one paper's opinion section while sipping coffee at the airport. Even the New York Times is waking up to the apres-Obama regulatory deluge.

As these stories make clear, the problem is not benevolent but ham-handed interventionism. The problem, much tougher, is best described as "cronyism." A veneer of public purpose stifles markets, to drive profits to connected parties in return for political support.

Can we really screw up every single market but make it all up with "demand?" The "ideas" and "stimulus" approaches presume everything else in the economy is working just fine. Is investment really slow only because there are, fundamentally, just no good ideas to invest in any more?

The deeper economic issue is whether "macro" and "growth" outcomes really can be separated from "micro" distortions in each market.

Rajan on cash transfers and corruption

Raghu Rajan, who just announced he is stepping down as Governor of the Central Bank of India, gave a very interesting speech, that bears among other things on the question of social programs vs. cash transfers.

A big problem with government provided assistance in India is that the provision is corrupt:

Our [India's] provision of public goods is unfortunately biased against access by the poor. In a number of states, ration shops do not supply what is due, even if one has a ration card – and too many amongst the poor do not have a ration card or a BPL card; Teachers do not show up at schools to teach; The police do not register crimes, or encroachments, especially if committed by the rich and powerful; Public hospitals are not adequately staffed and ostensibly free medicines are not available at the dispensary; …I can go on, but you know the all-too-familiar picture.

Raghu has a thoughtful observation on what keeps this system going:

This is where the crooked but savvy politician fits in. While the poor do not have the money to “purchase” public services that are their right, they have a vote that the politician wants. The politician does a little bit to make life a little more tolerable for his poor constituents – a government job here, an FIR registered there, a land right honoured somewhere else. For this, he gets the gratitude of his voters, and more important, their vote.

...perhaps the system tolerates corruption because the street smart politician is better at making the wheels of the bureaucracy creak, however slowly, in favour of his constituents. And such a system is self-sustaining. An idealist who is unwilling to “work” the system can promise to reform it, but the voters know there is little one person can do. Moreover, who will provide the patronage while the idealist is fighting the system? So why not stay with the fixer you know even if it means the reformist loses his deposit?

So the circle is complete. The poor and the under-privileged need the politician to help them get jobs and public services. The crooked politician needs the businessman to provide the funds that allow him to supply patronage to the poor and fight elections. The corrupt businessman needs the crooked politician to get public resources and contracts cheaply. And the politician needs the votes of the poor and the underprivileged. Every constituency is tied to the other in a cycle of dependence, which ensures that the status quo prevails. 

The Mafia may have had a similar equilibrium

What to do? Cash transfers are an attractive option

... money liberates. Could we not give poor households cash instead of promising them public services? A poor household with cash can patronize whomsoever it wants, and not just the monopolistic government provider. Because the poor can pay for their medicines or their food, they will command respect from the private provider. Not only will a corrupt fair price shop owner not be able to divert the grain he gets since he has to sell at market price, but because he has to compete with the shop across the street, he cannot afford to be surly or lazy. The government can add to the effects of empowering the poor by instilling a genuine cost to being uncompetitive – by shutting down parts of the public delivery systems that do not generate enough custom.

Much of what we need to do is already possible. The government intends to announce a scheme for full financial inclusion on Independence Day. It includes identifying the poor, creating unique biometric identifiers for them, opening linked bank accounts, and making government transfers into those accounts. When fully rolled out, I believe it will give the poor the choice and respect as well as the services they had to beg for in the past. It can break a link between poor public service, patronage, and corruption that is growing more worrisome over time.

...if there is evidence that cash transfers are being misspent – and we should let data rather than pre-conceived notions drive policy -- some portion could be given in the form of electronic coupons that can be spent by the specified recipient only on food, education or healthcare.

 A good summary

 One of the greatest dangers to the growth of developing countries is the middle income trap, where crony capitalism creates oligarchies that slow down growth. [Just developing countries?!] ... To avoid this trap, and to strengthen the independent democracy our leaders won for us sixty seven years ago, we have to improve public services, especially those targeted at the poor. A key mechanism to improve these services is through financial inclusion, which is going to be an important part of the government and the RBI’s plans in the coming years.

Raghu's efforts to reform India's banking and financial system deserve more notice.

(PS: Blogging will be a little spotty for the next week and a half, as I'm off at a glider competition.)

Financial Choice

If you're interested in policy rather than politics, the package of legislative proposals coming out of Congress are a lot more interesting than the Presidential race at the moment. Speaker Paul Ryan is rolling out "A Better Way" package and Rep. Jeb Hensarling has just announced a "financial CHOICE act" to fundamentally reform Dodd-Frank. (Most quotes are from Jeb Hensarling's speech at the Economic Club of New York. See also  NYT coverage.)

These efforts will, I think, become much more important later on. The presidential race will decide whether this agenda can survive the instant veto that it faces now.  (This is a non-partisan comment. Hilary Clinton could likely assure a landslide by announcing she will work with Paul Ryan to craft and pass it.)

In any case, it defines a clear program that may be the focus of economic policy under a presidency of either party. And I think that's healthy as well.  We are still living in the shadows of Franklin Roosevelt's 100 days, and an increasingly imperial presidency. But the current need is not for a flurry of new legislation and executive orders to address a crisis. We need a steady clean-up of the legal and regulatory mess of the last few decades. For that project, it may be better for policy leadership to come from Congress, and by careful and patient drafting of actual legislation.

The legislation is still being drafted, which is why it would be lovely if more of the media and blogosphere were paying attention rather than to the latest antics of the presidential candidates. The congressional staff writing these things are paying attention and the proposals can be refined!

Today, a look at the Financial CHOICE act.

More capital, and the carrot of less regulation

...there is a growing consensus surrounding the idea of a tradeoff between heightened capital levels and a substantially lower regulatory burden....[We] will relieve financial institutions from regulations that create more burden than benefit in exchange for meeting higher, yet simple, capital requirements...Think of it as a market-based, equity financed Dodd-Frank off- ramp... the option remains with the bank.

How to measure capital? This is a hard nut.

...banks that maintain a simple leverage ratio of at least 10 percent and, at the time of the election, have a composite CAMELS rating of 1 or 2 may elect to be functionally exempt from the post-Dodd-Frank supervisory regime, the Basel III capital and liquidity standards, and a number of other regulatory burdens that pre-date Dodd-Frank. 

This is an element worthy of more discussion. Leverage ratios have problems too, as they do not distinguish the riskiness of assets.  CAMELS ratings have their own problems.

As blog readers know, I think we can keep going well beyond 10% capital. I'd like to see steady incentives for more and more capital, rather than an arbitrary threshold.  My current thinking leads to reducing subsidies for debt, a fee on short term debt, and using ratios of market value of equity to debt. Or a schedule of regulatory reductions: so much for 10% capital, more for 20% capital, do what you want at 100%. But we're in danger here of repeating a Libertarian party sort of fight whether there should be drivers' licenses in Nirvana, so let's leave this as an open question for refinement.

It seems natural to ask for more capital on riskier assets, but a beautiful paragraph on risk-weights explains why that doesn't work.

Risk-weighting is simply not as effective. First, it is far too complex, requiring millions of calculations to measure capital adequacy. Second, it confers a competitive advantage on those large financial institutions that have the resources to navigate its mind-numbing complexity. Third, regulators have managed to get the risk weights tragically wrong, for example, treating toxic mortgage-backed securities and Greek sovereign debt as essentially risk-free. One myopic globally imposed view of risk is itself risky. Finally, risk-weighting places regulators in the position of micro-managing financial institutions, which politicizes credit allocation. Witness the World Bank recently advertising its zero risk rating under the Basel Accords for their “green bonds.”

The regulatory carrot: A bank with enough capital

would be deemed “well capitalized” for prompt corrective action purposes; It would no longer be subject to Basel Committee capital or liquidity requirements as implemented by the U.S. banking regulators;  It would be able to make capital distributions freely; and would additionally be able to consummate transactions without being subject to the regulatory challenge of increasing risk to the stability of our banking or financial system, or on grounds related to capital or liquidity standards of concentrations of deposits or assets. 

... no Federal rule establishing “heightened prudential standards” of the type provided for in Dodd-Frank would apply to qualifying banking organizations, including the living will requirement...In short, a strongly capitalized qualifying bank will be enabled to remove government bureaucrats from its boardroom and lend and invest freely.

From the executive summary,

Exempt banking organizations that have made a qualifying capital election from any federal law, rule, or regulation that permits a banking agency to consider risk “to the stability of the United States banking or financial system,” added to various federal banking laws by Section 604 of the Dodd-Frank Act, when reviewing an application to consummate a transaction or commence an activity.

A linguistic note: Not once in this speech, except while quoting others, does Rep. Hensarling use the phrase "to hold" capital. Every instance is "raise" capital. And explicitly, 

equity capital can be put to work no differently than debt or deposits. It is not money put under a mattress.

And as to the ballyhooed impossibility of raising capital, 

U.S. banks have raised hundreds of billions in new capital

Who says nobody in Congress understands finance!

Bankruptcy; no more "designation"  

The centerpiece of Dodd-Frank is the FSOC (Financial Stability Oversight Council's) ability to "designate" a firm as "systemically important," and then to "resolve" it, in place of bankruptcy.  This will go.

...bankruptcy, not bailouts. Recently the House passed the bipartisan Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act, which creates a new subchapter of the Bankruptcy Code tailored to specifically address the failure of a large, complex financial institution.....

The speech goes on with several good reasons bankruptcy is better than resolution.  I hear cheering from John Taylor's office already.

 Retroactively repeal the authority of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to designate firms as systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 

Fed Lending

...we impose on the Fed Bagehot’s famous dictum: lend freely, but only to solvent institutions, only against sound collateral, and only at interest rates high enough to dissuade those who are not genuinely in need. 

I'm a little leery of this one. Dictums are not analysis. If you want to stop a run, you have to lend pretty freely. Private institutions like a clearinghouse to do that once existed, but they have been put out of business by the Fed.  Nobody knows who is solvent vs. illiquid; the point of a run is that collateral that was "sound" yesterday is not today.  And if you want to stop a run, who cares if it's insolvent or illiquid? The Fed doesn't need quickly salable collateral, being super senior in bankruptcy is enough.  Bagehot's dictum is a great way to run a hedge fund. It's not necessarily the right way to run a central bank.

I worry that we are headed for the worst of all worlds -- people expect bailouts and free fed lending, but the government is legally constrained from doing so. All the moral hazard and none of the crisis mop. If we're going to go in this direction, it has to be crystal clear to people running banks that the government will not be able to step in next time, even stretching laws, and they'd better set things up carefully ahead of time. I'm afraid people are not going to believe any legal restrictions.

Rule of Law

Some of the most interesting parts of this proposal really belong together in "restoring the rule of law to regulation." That's a big project that I hear simmering in much of this Congressional planning. And, based on the daily news (for example the latest on the FCC takeover of the internet) not a minute too soon.

CFPB 

The "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau" is out of control.

fundamentally reforming the CFPB......task it with the dual mission of consumer protection and competitive markets, with a cost-benefit analysis of rules performed by an Office of Economic Analysis. 

 Replace the current single director with a bipartisan, five-member commission which is subject to congressional oversight and appropriations. 

... Repeal authority to ban bank products or services it deems “abusive” and its authority to prohibit arbitration. ... Repeal indirect auto lending guidance.

Federal Reserve 

One of the most thought-provoking proposals splits the Federal Reserve's regulatory power from its monetary policy power. It puts bank regulation, like all regulation, in the rule-of-law framework that is supposed to exist for regulation: cost-benefit analysis, Administrative Procedures Act, Congressional oversight, and so forth. Various quotes: 

Require that the different sets of conditions under which stress tests are evaluated subject to notice and comment period. 

... makes sure every financial regulation passes a rigorous cost-benefit test... 

We will put all the financial regulatory agencies on budget. The bare minimum level of accountability to “We the People” is to have their elected representatives in Congress control the power of the purse, as inscribed in our Constitution. 

But, wisely,

protects the Federal Reserve’s independence in conducting monetary policy by leaving that function off-budget. The Fed’s prudential regulatory and financial supervision activities, however, will now be subject to the normal and transparent congressional appropriations process.

SEC

...due process rights. Too many citizens have been “shook down” or abused by their government. Thus we will provide an immediate right of removal to federal court for respondents in administrative proceedings.  We will ensure that disciplinary proceedings are public, that all fines imposed by regulatory agencies are sent to the Treasury for deficit reduction, that regulatory entities created by Congress are subject to full congressional oversight, and that other due process rights are strengthened.

There is a curious section on increasing the SEC's power:

the Financial CHOICE Act will impose the toughest penalties in history for financial fraud, self- dealing and deception.

We will double the cap for the most serious securities law violations and will allow for triple monetary fines when penalties are tied to illegal profits. We will give the SEC new authority to impose sanctions more closely linked to investor losses – and increase punishments even more for repeat offenders. We will increase the maximum criminal fines for both individuals and firms that engage in insider trading.

I'm not aware of a big problem in the SEC (and DOJ) not being able to ruin people's lives adequately, or extort large enough settlements from banks. Perhaps this is an olive branch, which won't hurt much.

Broader project

A sense of the broader project to restore rule of law in regulation.

Dodd-Frank gives FSOC the ability to designate companies as Too Big to Fail if it “determines that material financial distress” at the company “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.” But nowhere in Dodd-Frank, or anywhere else in the U.S. Code for that matter, are these terms defined. So by defining these vague terms in any fashion that pleases them, this “super-group” of regulators can exert ultimate functional control over almost any large financial firm in our economy, and do so with utter disregard for due process. This is not the rule of law; it is the rule of rulers, and it’s an anathema to a free and democratic society.... 

Next, we repeal the Chevron doctrine requiring the judiciary to give deference to financial regulatory agencies’ interpretation of the law. The doctrine is unfair and an affront to due process and justice. 

I've gone on long enough. Legislation needs a public comment mechanism too, as this is  a big package, which though on a very good track can surely be refined a bit.